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B5 · باب أسماء صيغة الخطاب في استعمال الفقهاء · Wording by clarity, literal/figurative and explicit/allusive (v1/163–200)

1. B5.01 · الظاهر والنص والمفسر والمحكم · Four grades of clarity, each firmer than the last (v1/163–166)
2. B5.02 · الخفي والمشكل والمجمل والمتشابه · Four grades of unclarity; the mutashābih is left to God (v1/167–170)
3. B5.03 · الحقيقة والمجاز · The literal and the figurative are both in the Qurʾān; the figure works like the literal, including generality (v1/170–173)
4. B5.04 · لا يجتمع الحقيقة والمجاز · One word cannot bear its literal and figurative sense in one referent; two different referents may combine them if the figure does not crowd the literal; apparent cases are "the generality of the figure" (v1/173–177)
5. B5.05 · طريق الاستعارة · A figure is borrowed by connection in form or in meaning; ʿilla and ḥukm borrow for each other, but aṣl/farʿ and sabab/ḥukm borrow only one way (v1/177–184)
6. B5.06 · المجاز خلف عن الحقيقة · Abū Ḥanīfa: the figure substitutes for the literal in the wording; the Ṣāḥibān: in the ruling (v1/184–187)
7. B5.07 · الصريح والكناية · Explicit wording works by itself; allusive wording needs intention or a telling circumstance, and ḥudūd are not established by allusion (v1/187–190)
8. B5.08 · ما تترك به الحقيقة · Five things make one leave the literal sense (v1/190–195)
9. B5.09 · طريق معرفة الحقيقة · The literal sense is the one nearest the word's cause and most informative; it is left when impossible, customarily abandoned or legally abandoned (v1/196–200)

B5.01 · الظاهر والنص والمفسر والمحكم · Four grades of clarity, each firmer than the last (v1/163–166)

• Position: «هَذِه الْأَسْمَاء أَرْبَعَة الظَّاهِر وَالنَّص والمفسر والمحكم وَلها أضداد أَرْبَعَة الْخَفي والمشكل والمجمل والمتشابه» — "These names are four: the apparent, the text, the explained and the firm; and they have four opposites: the hidden, the problematic, the summary and the ambiguous." (v1/163)
  • Ẓāhir: «أما الظَّاهِر فَهُوَ مَا يعرف المُرَاد مِنْهُ بِنَفس السماع من غير تَأمل» (v1/163) — "what is understood by merely hearing it, without reflection" (e.g. "God has made trade lawful"). Its ruling binds with certainty, general or specific. (v1/163–164)
  • Naṣṣ: clearer through a context from the speaker, i.e. what the passage was spoken for. "God has made trade lawful and forbidden ribā" is ẓāhir in permitting sale and naṣṣ in distinguishing sale from ribā, since it answers the claim that they are alike. (v1/164)
  • Mufassar: «وَأما الْمُفَسّر فَهُوَ اسْم للمكشوف الَّذِي يعرف المُرَاد بِهِ مكشوفا على وَجه لَا يبْقى مَعَه احْتِمَال التَّأْوِيل» — "a name for the uncovered, whose meaning is known so plainly that no possibility of interpretation remains", though abrogation is still possible. Example: "the angels prostrated, all of them (kulluhum) together (ajmaʿūn)". (v1/165)
  • Muḥkam: beyond the mufassar, admitting neither interpretation nor abrogation ("God knows all things"). (v1/165–166)
• Who: "some jurists" limit "naṣṣ" to the specific; Sarakhsī: "it is not so", by the word's etymology. Others limit it to its occasion. Against the second: «فَإِن الْعبْرَة لعُمُوم الْخطاب لَا لخُصُوص السَّبَب عندنَا» — "for what counts is the generality of the address, not the particularity of the occasion, in our view." (v1/164)
• Use: the grades matter when texts conflict: the higher overrides the lower. (v1/166)
• Furūʿ test: "I marry you for a month" is a mutʿa, not a marriage: "I marry" is naṣṣ for marriage, but "for a month" is mufassar for mutʿa, and the mufassar prevails. (v1/166) In reply to a claim of debt, "true" (al-ḥaqq) is an admission; "piety" (al-birr) is like the mujmal, but becomes an admission when joined to "true"; "righteousness" (al-ṣalāḥ) is firm as a new statement, so "righteousness, true" is a rebuff. (v1/166)
• Naṣṣ vs ẓāhir in one verse: "divorce them for their ʿidda" (Q 65:1) is naṣṣ on keeping the sunna time when divorcing, since the passage was brought for that, and ẓāhir in commanding no more than one pronouncement. (v1/164–165)

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B5.02 · الخفي والمشكل والمجمل والمتشابه · Four grades of unclarity; the mutashābih is left to God (v1/167–170)

• Khafī: meaning hidden by something incidental to the form, needing search. Example: the theft verse is apparent for the ordinary thief but hidden for the pickpocket (ṭarrār) and the grave-robber (nabbāsh), who have their own names. (v1/167)
  • Some call the opposite of the ẓāhir "mubham" (from "a pitch-dark night"); Sarakhsī: "but I chose the first", since "mubham" in the language means unqualified ("a horse of one colour"; Ibn ʿAbbās, "leave unrestricted what God left unrestricted" — glossed by Sarakhsī as: do not restrict the prohibition on wives' mothers by requiring consummation with the daughters). (v1/167)
  • ⚑ Abū Yūsuf: the grave-robber is cut, like the pickpocket. Abū Ḥanīfa and Muḥammad: not cut, since his name marks a deficiency in theft (no guarded, guarding owner), while the pickpocket's name marks an excess of skill, so extending the ruling to him is a fortiori. (v1/167)
• Mushkil: the meaning is mixed in with similar cases and needs a separating proof or deep reflection. (v1/168)
• Mujmal: the meaning is known only by the speaker's explanation: ribā (not every excess is meant), ṣalāt, zakāt. (v1/168–169)
• Mutashābih: «وَأما الْمُتَشَابه فَهُوَ اسْم لما انْقَطع رَجَاء معرفَة المُرَاد مِنْهُ لمن اشْتبهَ فِيهِ عَلَيْهِ» — "a name for that whose meaning one cannot hope to know, for the one to whom it is obscure"; its ruling is belief in its truth and surrender, without searching. Example: the disjointed letters. (v1/169)
  • «فالوقف عندنَا فِي هَذَا الْموضع» — "The stop, in our view, is at this point": at "none knows its interpretation except God" (Q 3:7); "and those firm in knowledge" begins a new sentence. The firm scholar believes in it and does not pursue its meaning. (v1/169)
  • The purpose of the graded clarity: a test, and to honour the firmly-grounded scholars, since people must return to them. (v1/169–170)
  • Application in creed: seeing God in the Hereafter is known by text (Q 75:22–23); direction is impossible for Him: «إِلَّا أَن الْجِهَة مُمْتَنع فَإِن الله تَعَالَى لَا جِهَة لَهُ» — "except that direction is impossible: God has no direction" (v1/170). What is mutashābih is the how of the vision, including the question of direction; the root of the vision is known by text. Likewise "the face" and "the hand": the root is known, the how is mutashābih. The Muʿtazila denied the root because the how was unclear to them; Ahl al-Sunna affirmed the root and stopped at the how. (v1/170)
• Ruling of each: khafī, seek; mushkil, reflect and then act; mujmal, suspend until explained; mutashābih, believe and do not seek. (v1/168–169)

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B5.03 · الحقيقة والمجاز · The literal and the figurative are both in the Qurʾān; the figure works like the literal, including generality (v1/170–173)

• Definitions: «الْحَقِيقَة اسْم لكل لفظ هُوَ مَوْضُوع فِي الأَصْل لشَيْء مَعْلُوم» — "the literal (ḥaqīqa) is every word coined originally for a known thing". «وَالْمجَاز اسْم لكل لفظ هُوَ مستعار لشَيْء غير مَا وضع لَهُ» — "the figurative (majāz) is every word borrowed for something other than what it was coined for." Both are found in God's speech, the Prophet's and people's. (v1/170)
• Who: "some of al-Shāfiʿī's followers" deny generality to the figurative, e.g. to set aside Ibn ʿUmar's "not a ṣāʿ for two ṣāʿs" in favour of "food for food". Their reason: figure is resorted to out of need. (v1/171) Reply: generality comes from a separate indicator (the article on an indefinite), which the figure can carry. The figure stands in for the literal and does its work, like a borrowed garment. Figure is found in God's speech, and God is not in need. (v1/171–172)
• The difference: the literal cannot be negated of its object; the figurative can ("grandfather" is not truly "father"). So the literal prevails, unless it is abandoned. (v1/172)
  • "I won't eat from this tree / this pot": the fruit and the cooked food, since the literal is abandoned. "From this sheep": its meat, not its milk, since the literal is not abandoned. ⚑ "From this flour": some of our shaykhs say he breaks it by eating the flour itself; «وَالأَصَح أَنه لَا يَحْنَث» — "the sounder view is that he does not", since eating raw flour is abandoned. (v1/172)
  • When the literal is abandoned, the figure works like an exception by the evident purpose. So one who swears not to live in this house, and starts moving out at once, does not break the oath; likewise: if he had earlier made a conditional divorce pronouncement, then swore not to divorce, and the earlier condition is then fulfilled, he does not break the oath; and the oath not to kill taken after wounding, when the wounded man then dies. (v1/172–173)

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B5.04 · لا يجتمع الحقيقة والمجاز · One word cannot bear its literal and figurative sense in one referent; two different referents may combine them if the figure does not crowd the literal; apparent cases are "the generality of the figure" (v1/173–177)

• Position: «وَمن أَحْكَام الْحَقِيقَة وَالْمجَاز أَنَّهُمَا لَا يَجْتَمِعَانِ فِي لفظ وَاحِد فِي حَالَة وَاحِدَة على أَن يكون كل وَاحِد مِنْهُمَا مرَادا بِحَال» — "Among the rules of the literal and figurative: they never combine in one word at one time, each being meant." A garment cannot be owned and borrowed at once. (v1/173)
• Furūʿ test: "or you have touched women" (Q 4:43, 5:6) means intercourse, not touching by hand, since intercourse is agreed to be meant (tayammum for the junub), so the literal is excluded. The khamr texts do not cover other intoxicants for the ḥadd — no ḥadd is due for them unless they intoxicate — since the literal (uncooked grape juice that has become strong/intoxicating) is meant. Abū Ḥanīfa: a bequest to "the sons of so-and-so" excludes grandsons; security for "fathers" excludes grandfathers; "his mawlās" excludes the freedmen of freedmen when he has his own. (v1/173–174)
• Objection → Reply: "Your rulings combine them: 'setting foot' in a house covers riding; 'the day so-and-so arrives' covers night; 'his house' covers a rented one; security for 'sons' covers grandsons; a vow of Rajab with an oath intended; drinking 'from the Euphrates' by a cup; eating 'from this wheat' as bread." Reply: in each, the purpose is a broader figurative meaning (entering; a time; residence; drinking its water; eating what is in it), and the ruling follows «لعُمُوم الْمجَاز لَا لعُمُوم الْحَقِيقَة» (v1/175) — "by the generality of the figure, not the generality of the literal". The vow case has two words, and the grandsons case is an istiḥsān for sparing blood. (v1/174–176) ⚑ In the Euphrates and wheat cases this answer is the Ṣāḥibān's: Abū Ḥanīfa holds that drinking from the Euphrates by mouth and eating the grain itself are literal, used and not abandoned, so the figure gives way and the cup and the bread do not break the oath. (v1/176) → B5.06
• Who: ⚑ «وَقد رَأَيْت بعض الْعِرَاقِيّين من أَصْحَابنَا قَالُوا إِن الْحَقِيقَة وَالْمجَاز لَا يَجْتَمِعَانِ فِي لفظ وَاحِد فِي مَحل وَاحِد وَلَكِن فِي محلين مُخْتَلفين يجوز أَن يجتمعا» — "I have seen some of the Iraqis among our colleagues say: the literal and the figurative do not combine in one word in one object, but may combine in two different objects." Sarakhsī: «وَهَذَا قريب» — "this is close", on condition that the figure does not crowd the literal. Example: "your mothers and daughters" (Q 4:23) cover grandmothers and granddaughters. (v1/177) Likewise Abū Ḥanīfa reads "clean earth (ṣaʿīd)" (Q 4:43) to cover every kind of earth by a meaning common to all, though the name is literally for soil. (v1/177) The test that separates this from the shared word: security asked "for my mawālīs" when he has both patrons and clients covers the group he intended; with no intention both are safe, since the grant reaches one of them, the word being shared; security "for my mawālīs" when he has clients and clients of clients covers both, literal in one and figurative in the other. (v1/177)

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B5.05 · طريق الاستعارة · A figure is borrowed by connection in form or in meaning; ʿilla and ḥukm borrow for each other, but aṣl/farʿ and sabab/ḥukm borrow only one way (v1/177–184)

• Position: the literal is known by hearing (like a text); the figurative by knowing how the Arabs borrow (like qiyās), so a new figure is valid if it follows their method. (v1/177–178) Borrowing rests on connection «صُورَة أَو معنى» (v1/178) — "in form or in meaning" (lion for the brave; "sky" for rain; "ghāʾiṭ" for the act). In legal matters, causal connection matches connection of form, and connection in the law's purpose matches connection of meaning. (v1/178–179)
• Marriage by "gift" or "sale" wording: the Prophet's marriage by "hiba" (Q 33:50) was by borrowing, since his privilege was only a lightening, not a new mode of speech. So for everyone, marriage is valid with wording that transfers ownership of the person, because ownership of the person causes the right of enjoyment. (v1/179–181)
  • al-Shāfiʿī: only "nikāḥ/tazwīj", since marriage serves countless purposes that ownership words do not express; the Prophet's case was a special privilege (Q 33:50, "exclusively for you"). (v1/179–180) Reply: the purpose of the contract is the ownership (hence the dower, and divorce in the husband's hand). (v1/180–181)
• One-way borrowing (v1/181–183): between an effective cause and its ruling, borrowing goes both ways ("if I own a slave…" and "if I buy a slave…"). Between a cause and what follows from it, only the cause is borrowed for the effect. So "you are free" works for divorce, with intention, but "you are divorced" does not free a slave. al-Shāfiʿī allows both by similarity; Sarakhsī: similarity counts only in the specific, defining feature (as the brave are called lions, not the living). Divorce lifts a barrier; manumission creates a new strength. (v1/182–183)
• Objection → Reply (v1/183–184): "sale" wording cannot make a lease, because a non-existent benefit cannot be sold, not because borrowing fails ("I sell you myself for a month" works for a free man). "Free your slave on my behalf for 1,000" is not a figure for a sale: «فَمن يَقُول إِن ذَلِك مجَاز عَن الشِّرَاء فقد أَخطَأ خطأ فَاحِشا» — "whoever says it is a figure for purchase has made a gross error" (v1/184); the purchase is implied by necessity (iqtiḍāʾ). Buying a relative frees him because ownership completes the cause of freedom ("cause of the cause"), not by figure.

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B5.06 · المجاز خلف عن الحقيقة · Abū Ḥanīfa: the figure substitutes for the literal in the wording; the Ṣāḥibān: in the ruling (v1/184–187)

• Who: ⚑ «وَمن أَحْكَام هَذَا الْفَصْل أَن اللَّفْظ مَتى كَانَ لَهُ حَقِيقَة مستعملة ومجاز مُتَعَارَف فعلى قَول أبي حنيفَة مطلقه يتَنَاوَل الْحَقِيقَة المستعملة دون الْمجَاز» — "Among this chapter's rules: when a word has a literal sense in use and a customary figurative sense, on Abū Ḥanīfa's view the unqualified word covers the literal in use, not the figurative"; on the Ṣāḥibān's view it covers both, by the generality of the figure. (v1/184)
  • The root: for the Ṣāḥibān the figure substitutes for the literal in the ruling; for Abū Ḥanīfa it substitutes in the speaking, so it needs only a well-formed sentence. (v1/184–185)
• Furūʿ test: ⚑ saying to one's slave who is older than oneself "this is my son": Abū Ḥanīfa says he is freed; the Ṣāḥibān say he is not, since the literal is impossible. (v1/185) Abū Ḥanīfa's two routes: an initial freeing by figure — under which the mother does not become an umm walad for him, «وَلِهَذَا لَا تصير الْأُم أم ولد لَهُ لِأَنَّهُ لَيْسَ لتحرير الْغُلَام ابْتِدَاء تَأْثِير فِي إِيجَاب أُميَّة الْوَلَد» — "for this reason the mother does not become an umm walad for him, since an initial freeing of the boy has no effect in establishing umm-walad status" (v1/186) — or an admission of freedom from the time of ownership, under which she does, «وعَلى هَذَا الطَّرِيق نقُول الْجَارِيَة تصير أم ولد لَهُ» — "on this route we say the girl becomes an umm walad for him" (v1/186); «وَهنا هُوَ الْأَصَح» — "and this is the sounder", as the coercion case shows. (v1/186) "This is my daughter", said of a wife of known lineage, does not dissolve the marriage. "O my son" (a call) frees nothing; "O free one" does. (v1/187)
  • ⚑ The flagship cases of this split (v1/184): "I will not drink from the Euphrates" and "I will not eat from this wheat". The Ṣāḥibān: drinking from a cup and eating its bread break the oath, by the generality of the figure. Abū Ḥanīfa: they do not, since the literal (drinking by mouth, eating the grain) is in use. (v1/176) → B5.04
  • The Ṣāḥibān also make the "sale" of a free woman a marriage, since what bars the original ruling there is a legal bar (her firm freedom). (v1/185)

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B5.07 · الصريح والكناية · Explicit wording works by itself; allusive wording needs intention or a telling circumstance, and ḥudūd are not established by allusion (v1/187–190)

• Definitions: the explicit (ṣarīḥ) is "every word whose meaning and intent are exposed, literal or figurative"; the allusive (kināya) is what hides its intent until shown by proof: pronouns, and a figure before it becomes customary. (v1/187–188) Allusion differs from figure: nicknames by opposites ("father of the white" for a black man) have no connection at all. (v1/188)
• Rulings: «ثمَّ حكم الصَّرِيح ثُبُوت مُوجبه بِنَفسِهِ من غير حَاجَة إِلَى عَزِيمَة» — "The ruling of the explicit: its effect holds by itself, without need of intention" (e.g. divorce and manumission words, in any grammatical form). (v1/188) «وَحكم الْكِنَايَة أَن الحكم بهَا لَا يثبت إِلَّا بِالنِّيَّةِ أَو مَا يقوم مقَامهَا من دلَالَة الْحَال» — "The ruling of the allusive: no ruling holds by it except by intention, or what stands in for it from the circumstances." (v1/188–189)
  • The jurists' "allusions of divorce" (unlawful, separated) are "allusive" only figuratively: once intended, they work by their own meaning (so they give irrevocable separation). "Count [your ʿidda]" is truly allusive. After consummation, meaning divorce: «فَإِذا نوى الطَّلَاق وَكَانَ بعد الدُّخُول وَقع الطَّلَاق بِمُقْتَضَاهُ» — "when he intends divorce and it is after consummation, the divorce occurs by its implication" (v1/189), since counting the ʿidda by quruʾ can only follow a divorce; this gives one revocable divorce. Before consummation: «وَإِن كَانَ قبل الدُّخُول يَقع الطَّلَاق بِهِ عِنْد النِّيَّة على أَنه لفظ مستعار للطَّلَاق شرعا» — "and if it is before consummation, the divorce occurs by it upon intention, it being a word legally borrowed for divorce" (v1/189).
• Ḥudūd are not established by allusion: a confession needs the explicit word; the mute is not punished on gestures; "you spoke truly" to an accuser is not qadhf; "as for me, I am no fornicator" is insinuation, not qadhf. (v1/189) But "he is as you said" is qadhf, since the "kāf" of likening is general where the object allows. (v1/190)

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B5.08 · ما تترك به الحقيقة · Five things make one leave the literal sense (v1/190–195)

• Position: «وَهِي خَمْسَة أَنْوَاع أَحدهَا دلَالَة الِاسْتِعْمَال عرفا وَالثَّانِي دلَالَة اللَّفْظ وَالثَّالِث سِيَاق النّظم وَالرَّابِع دلَالَة من وصف الْمُتَكَلّم وَالْخَامِس من مَحل الْكَلَام» — "They are five: usage by custom; an indication in the word; the context of the passage; an indication from the speaker; and the object of the speech." (v1/190)
  1. Custom: ṣalāt, ḥajj; a vow "to walk to the House of God" = ḥajj; "heads", "eggs" in oaths. (v1/190–191)
  2. The word itself (deficiency or excess): "meat" excludes fish and locusts (deficient in the meaning of meat) but not pork. "Every slave of mine" excludes the mukātab without intention. ⚑ Fruit: Abū Ḥanīfa excludes grapes, dates and pomegranates as more than fruit; the Ṣāḥibān include them. ⚑ Condiment (idām): Abū Ḥanīfa, what one dips into; Muḥammad includes cheese, eggs and meat; two reports from Abū Yūsuf. (v1/191–192)
  3. Context: "let whoever wishes believe…" (Q 18:29) is a threat; "I owe him 1,000, God willing" binds nothing; "come down if you are a man" is not a grant of security. (v1/192–193)
  4. The speaker: "incite with your voice" (Q 17:64) is not a command from God; "come and lunch with me" answered by an oath refers to that lunch only. (v1/193–194)
  5. The object: "the blind and the seeing are not equal" (Q 35:19) only as to sight. The ḥadīths «الْأَعْمَال بِالنِّيَّاتِ» ("actions are by intentions") and "lifted from my community are error, forgetting and coercion" are not general: they concern either the ruling or the sin, and the two cannot both be meant, so they are not proof on validity without further evidence. (v1/194)
• Who: ⚑ «والعراقيون من مَشَايِخنَا يَزْعمُونَ أَنه لَا عُمُوم للنصوص الْمُوجبَة لتَحْرِيم الْأَعْيَان» — "The Iraqis among our shaykhs claim that texts forbidding things (carrion, mothers, wine) have no generality", because unlawfulness describes acts, not things. Sarakhsī: «وَهَذَا غلط فَاحش» — "this is a gross error". The prohibition truly attaches to the things, taking them out of the scope of lawful acts, like abrogation. (v1/195)

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B5.09 · طريق معرفة الحقيقة · The literal sense is the one nearest the word's cause and most informative; it is left when impossible, customarily abandoned or legally abandoned (v1/196–200)

• Position: to know the literal sense, look to the reason for the name: what is nearer and more informative has the better claim, judged by the object and by the form. (v1/196)
• First illustration (the object): «فَعِنْدَ بَعضهم مُوجبه عِنْد الْإِطْلَاق أخص الْخُصُوص وَعِنْدنَا مُوجبه الْعُمُوم وَمَا قُلْنَاهُ أَحَق» — "for some, the general unqualified requires its narrowest specification; for us it requires generality, and ours has the better claim": otherwise part of what the word covers would go unmeant, and the ʿāmm would repeat the khāṣṣ, which has its own form. Objection: "the repetition serves emphasis". Reply: the unqualified word requires the complete, and a new meaning is a greater benefit than emphasis. (v1/196) → B4.03
• Furūʿ test
  • "Or you have touched women": intercourse, since touching would repeat one kind of ḥadath, while intercourse adds the second kind. (v1/196–197)
  • Idle oaths (laghw, Q 2:225): "our scholars", an oath with no possible benefit (a false oath about the past). al-Shāfiʿī: what slips out without intention. Sarakhsī: ours is nearer, since the slip has its own names (error, oversight). (v1/197)
  • "What you knotted (ʿaqqadtum)": the tying of speech to speech, not heart-resolve, against al-Shāfiʿī. (v1/197–198)
  • "Three qurūʾ": periods of menstruation, on each possible root of the word. (v1/198)
  • "Nikāḥ": intercourse is its literal sense (the root is joining); the contract is figurative, used when the literal is impossible. (v1/199)
• When the literal is set aside (v1/199–200): it is impossible ("eat from this palm"); abandoned by custom ("drink from this well"); or abandoned by law (a power of attorney "to litigate" covers answering, since denying a true claim is forbidden; "this boy" in an oath of avoidance holds when he is old, since a boy calls for mercy, not avoidance).
  • ⚑ Scooping water from the well by mouth: our shaykhs differ on whether it breaks the oath; «وَلَكِن الأول أوجه» — "but the first view is sounder": it does, by the generality of the figure. (v1/199)
• [Editorial] Debate note: B5.06 and B5.08 hold several intra-Ḥanafī splits that turn on principle (the figure as substitute in speech vs in ruling; the Iraqis on "prohibited things"). Quote the side and Sarakhsī's verdict rather than "the Ḥanafīs say".

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