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B2 · باب الأمر · Command (al-amr) (v1/11–78)

1. B2.01 · حقيقة الأمر وصيغته · "Amr" is the imperative form addressed to an equal or inferior (the rank condition is the jurists' addition); the act is called "amr" only figuratively (v1/11–14)
2. B2.02 · أي معاني الصيغة أمر حقيقة · Of the imperative's seven uses, only obligation is "amr" in the proper sense (v1/14–15)
3. B2.03 · موجب الأمر المطلق · The unqualified command obliges, unless evidence shows otherwise (v1/15–18)
4. B2.04 · الأمر بعد الحظر · A command after a prohibition still obliges, unless evidence shows otherwise (v1/19)
5. B2.05 · الأمر والتكرار · The command neither requires nor admits repetition; it yields the least of its kind, with the whole as a possibility (v1/20–25)
6. B2.06 · الأمر المطلق عن الوقت · An unqualified command may be delayed; no immediate performance, but dying after being able to perform, without performing, is culpable (v1/26–30)
7. B2.07 · الموقت: الوقت ظرف · A command tied to a time: for prayer, time is container, condition and cause (v1/30–36)
8. B2.08 · الموقت: الوقت معيار · Ramaḍān: the time is the measure, so no other fast is valid in it, except a traveller's intended obligation for Abū Ḥanīfa (v1/36–42)
9. B2.09 · الموقت: المشكل · Ḥajj: an ambiguous case between prayer and fasting (v1/42–44)
10. B2.10 · الأداء والقضاء · Performance is handing over the very duty; make-up is discharging it with a like; make-up is owed by the original cause (v1/44–48)
11. B2.11 · أنواع الأداء والقضاء · Performance is complete, deficient, or like make-up; make-up is by an understood like or one not understood (v1/48–59)
12. B2.12 · حسن المأمور به · The command makes its object good by the law, not by reason; the unqualified command gives the highest grade of goodness (v1/60–65)
13. B2.13 · القدرة شرط الأداء · Capacity conditions performance: minimal capacity for most duties, "facilitating" capacity for some (v1/65–73)
14. B2.14 · خطاب الكفار بالشرائع · Non-Muslims are addressed by faith, penalties, dealings and the next-world reckoning; whether they must perform acts of worship now is disputed among the Ḥanafīs (v1/73–78)

B2.01 · حقيقة الأمر وصيغته · "Amr" is the imperative form addressed to an equal or inferior (the rank condition is the jurists' addition); the act is called "amr" only figuratively (v1/11–14)

• Position: «اعْلَم أَن الْأَمر أحد أَقسَام الْكَلَام بِمَنْزِلَة الْخَبَر والاستخبار» — "Know that the command is one of the divisions of speech, like the statement and the question." (v1/11) The linguists define amr as saying to another "do!"; the jurists add rank: addressed to an equal or inferior it is a command, addressed to a superior it is a request or a prayer. (v1/11)
  • «ثمَّ المُرَاد بِالْأَمر يعرف بِهَذِهِ الصِّيغَة فَقَط وَلَا يعرف حَقِيقَة الْأَمر بِدُونِ هَذِه الصِّيغَة فِي قَول الْجُمْهُور من الْفُقَهَاء» — "What is intended by commanding (al-murād bi-l-amr) is known by this form alone, and the true command is not known without this form, in the view of most jurists." (v1/11)
• Who: «وَقَالَ بعض أَصْحَاب مَالك وَالشَّافِعِيّ يعرف حَقِيقَة المُرَاد بِالْأَمر بِدُونِ هَذِه الصِّيغَة» — "Some followers of Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī said the true intent of a command can be known without this form." «وعَلى هَذَا يبتني الْخلاف فِي أَفعَال رَسُول الله» — "On this is built the dispute over the Messenger's acts", i.e. whether they are binding. (v1/11) → B12
  • Their proofs: verses where "amr" means one's way or deed (e.g. Q 24:63, 11:97); the two plurals awāmir (sayings) / umūr (deeds); "pray as you have seen me pray"; and whoever calls the deed-sense a figure must name the route of the figure. (v1/11–12)
• Proofs (v1/12–14)
  1. A purpose as great as commanding must have a dedicated expression, as past, future and present do. (v1/12)
  2. Language: no one calls a person who performs an act an "āmir". (v1/12)
  3. Negation test: one who says "I commanded nothing today" is truthful even if he did many things, and what is a true name cannot be negated. (v1/13)
  4. The Prophet asked why the Companions took off their sandals, and he objected to their continuous fasting. And "pray as you have seen me pray" would add nothing if the act alone obliged imitation. (v1/13–14)
• Objection → Reply: the verses show "amr" used for deeds. Reply: we do not deny figurative use; the Qurʾān uses "amr" for decree, religion, speech, revelation, the Hour, punishment and sin. (v1/13) "Name the route of the figure": «وَطَرِيق هَذَا الْمجَاز أَنهم فِي قَوْلهم أَمر فلَان سديد مُسْتَقِيم أجروا اسْم الْمصدر على الْمَفْعُول بِهِ» — "The route of this figure: in saying 'so-and-so's amr is sound', they applied the verbal noun to its object", as in "this dirham is the prince's striking". (v1/13)
• [Editorial] Debate note: This is the root of the later question whether the Prophet's acts oblige (B12). Keep the two apart: here the claim is only about what the word "amr" names.

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B2.02 · أي معاني الصيغة أمر حقيقة · Of the imperative's seven uses, only obligation is "amr" in the proper sense (v1/14–15)

• Position: The form is used for obligation, recommendation, permission, guidance, challenge, rebuke and request. No one disputes that request, rebuke and challenge are not "amr", or that obligation is. For recommendation, permission and guidance, Sarakhsī sides with al-Karkhī and al-Jaṣṣāṣ: they are called "amr" only figuratively. (v1/14–15)
• Who: «فَذكر الْكَرْخِي والجصاص رحمهمَا الله أَن هَذَا لَا يُسمى أمرا حَقِيقَة وَإِن كَانَ الِاسْم يتَنَاوَلهُ مجَازًا» — "al-Karkhī and al-Jaṣṣāṣ said this is not truly called a command, though the name covers it figuratively." (v1/14) The Shāfiʿīs are split: some call all of it "amr" properly; some include recommendation because it earns reward. (v1/14–15)
• Proofs
  1. «وَالدَّلِيل عَلَيْهِ أَن الْعَرَب تسمي تَارِك الْأَمر عَاصِيا» — "The proof: the Arabs call the one who abandons a command disobedient", as the Qurʾān does ("did you disobey my command?"), and no one is called disobedient for leaving what is permitted or recommended. (v1/15)
  2. Negation test: "God did not command me to fast six days of Shawwāl" is true; "…to fast Ramaḍān" is false. (v1/15)
• Objection → Reply: "Reward for recommended acts shows obedience to a command." Reply: reward comes from acting against the self's desire for God's pleasure; that does not require a command. (v1/14–15) "Recommendation is part of obligation, so it is not a different meaning." Reply: obligation cuts off the choice, recommendation does not, so they differ. (v1/15)

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B2.03 · موجب الأمر المطلق · The unqualified command obliges, unless evidence shows otherwise (v1/15–18)

• Position: «فَالْمَذْهَب عِنْد جُمْهُور الْفُقَهَاء أَن مُوجب مطلقه الْإِلْزَام إِلَّا بِدَلِيل» — "The position of most jurists: what the unqualified command requires is obligation, unless there is evidence." (v1/15)
• Who
  • Ibn Surayj (a Shāfiʿī): suspension (waqf) until the meaning is shown, which he claimed as al-Shāfiʿī's view; most Shāfiʿīs rejected this attribution. (v1/15–16)
  • Some Mālikīs: permission; others: recommendation. (v1/16)
• Proofs
  1. The Companions acted on the Prophet's imperatives without seeking further evidence, including those absent from the gathering who received only the words. He rebuked Ubayy b. Kaʿb for delaying his answer by citing only the imperative "respond to God and the Messenger" (Q 8:24). (v1/16)
  2. Custom: whoever disobeys a command from one he must obey is blamed. (v1/16)
  3. Each form of speech has one original meaning; ambiguity comes only from an external cause. (v1/16)
  4. Q 33:36 (no choice once God and His Messenger decide); Q 7:12 (Iblīs blamed for not prostrating); Q 24:63 (fear for those who oppose his command). (v1/18)
  5. Caution: obligation is the safer reading, since the recommended act brings reward and its omission no punishment. (v1/17)
  6. Reason, the third leg of «يشْهد بِهِ الْكتاب وَالْإِجْمَاع والمعقول» (v1/18) — "the Kitāb, consensus and reason attest to it": "amr" is transitive and its intransitive is "iʾtimār", «فَهَذَا يَقْتَضِي أَن لَا يكون أمرا بِدُونِ الائتمار كَمَا لَا يكون كسرا بِدُونِ الانكسار» — "so there is no commanding without compliance, as there is no breaking without being broken". (v1/19) But existence of the act cannot attach to the form itself, or the addressee's choice would vanish: «تَحَرُّزًا عَن القَوْل بالجبر فأثبتنا بِهِ آكِد مَا يكون من وُجُوه الطّلب وَهُوَ الْإِلْزَام» — "guarding against the doctrine of compulsion, we established by it the most emphatic kind of demand, which is binding." (v1/19) → B3
• Objection → Reply
  • Suspension: the form has many uses, so none is fixed without evidence. Reply: then prohibition would also be suspended, making command and prohibition the same; and possible other meanings only stop it being muḥkam, not from having a meaning. (v1/16)
  • Permission: a wise one commands only the good, so the least is permission. Reply: permission already shows goodness; the form is made for something more. (v1/17)
  • Recommendation is the certain minimum. Reply: the unqualified form requires the complete kind of demand, since neither the form nor the speaker's authority falls short; otherwise the ʿāmm would mean its minimum too; and calling obligation figurative would justify saying "God did not command faith or prayer". (v1/17)
• Aside: Sarakhsī takes "kun" (Q 36:82) as a real command, not a figure for creating, and infers from the "fa" of sequence that God's speech precedes all created things, and so is neither originated nor created. (v1/18)

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B2.04 · الأمر بعد الحظر · A command after a prohibition still obliges, unless evidence shows otherwise (v1/19)

• Position: «فَالصَّحِيح عندنَا أَن مطلقه للْإِيجَاب أَيْضا» — "The sound view with us is that its unqualified form also obliges." This holds whenever performance is possible, «إِلَّا أَن يقوم دَلِيل مَانع» — "unless there stands evidence preventing it." (v1/19)
• Who: some Shāfiʿīs: it gives permission only, since it lifts a ban. Their verses: "disperse through the land" after Friday prayer (Q 62:10) and "hunt" after leaving iḥrām (Q 5:2). (v1/19)
• Reply: the permission in those cases comes from other texts ("lawful to you are the good things", "God has made trade lawful"), not from the imperative. The imperative's own work is to seek the act; the lifting of the ban is a by-product. (v1/19)

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B2.05 · الأمر والتكرار · The command neither requires nor admits repetition; it yields the least of its kind, with the whole as a possibility (v1/20–25)

• Position: «الصَّحِيح من مَذْهَب عُلَمَائِنَا أَن صِيغَة الْأَمر لَا توجب التّكْرَار وَلَا تحتمله» — "The sound position of our scholars: the command form neither requires repetition nor admits it." «وَلَكِن الْأَمر بِالْفِعْلِ يَقْتَضِي أدنى مَا يكون من جنسه على احْتِمَال الْكل» — "Rather, commanding an act requires the least of its kind, with the whole as a possibility." (v1/20)
• Who
  • ⚑ «وَقَالَ بعض مَشَايِخنَا هَذَا إِذا لم يكن مُعَلّقا بِشَرْط وَلَا مُقَيّدا بِوَصْف» — "Some of our shaykhs said: this holds when it is not tied to a condition or qualified by a description", otherwise it repeats as they repeat. (v1/20) Sarakhsī: «وَالصَّحِيح عِنْدِي أَن هَذَا لَيْسَ بِمذهب عُلَمَائِنَا» — "The sound view with me is that this is not our scholars' position." (v1/21) The furūʿ refute it: «فَإِن من قَالَ لامْرَأَته إِذا دخلت الدَّار فَأَنت طَالِق لم تطلق بِهَذَا اللَّفْظ إِلَّا مرّة وَإِن تكَرر مِنْهَا الدُّخُول» — "whoever says to his wife 'if you enter the house you are divorced' divorces her only once by these words, even if she enters repeatedly." (v1/21) He traces the view to al-Shāfiʿī's rule of tayammum for every prayer (Q 5:6), and calls al-Shāfiʿī's reading of the verse an oversight, since the exegetes agree it means "when you rise… while in ḥadath". (v1/22)
  • al-Shāfiʿī: «مطلقه لَا يُوجب التّكْرَار وَلَكِن يحْتَملهُ» — "the unqualified form does not require repetition but admits it", and number too, with evidence. (v1/20) His argument: «وَذَلِكَ أَن قَوْله افْعَل يَقْتَضِي مصدرا على سَبِيل التنكير أَي افْعَل فعلا» — "'do' implies a verbal noun in indefinite form, i.e. 'do a doing'" (v1/21). An indefinite in an affirmation is particular, yet it admits number, because that indefinite is itself multiple, which is why one can say "divorce her twice" as a specification; in a prohibition the indefinite is under negation and so is general. (v1/21)
  • al-Muzanī (as reported): it requires repetition. His proof: al-Aqraʿ b. Ḥābis asked "every year?" about ḥajj. (v1/20)
  • ⚑ ʿĪsā b. Abān (as reported): where the act has a known end (divorce, ʿidda), the form admits repetition; where it has none (fast, pray), it does not. Sarakhsī: the argument above shows its weakness. (v1/25)
• Proofs
  1. An act is a set of motions that pass away; a "second time" is a new act of the same kind, not a repetition of the same one. (v1/23)
  2. The imperative is singular in form; singular does not bear plural or number, as "buy me a slave" means one slave. (v1/23–24)
  3. Recurring acts of worship recur because their cause recurs (a prayer's time, Ramaḍān), not because of the imperative. (v1/22)
  4. al-Jaṣṣāṣ: after doing it once, anyone may truly say "he did what he was commanded". (v1/25)
• Objection → Reply: "Number can be attached as a specification, so the form admits it" (al-Shāfiʿī). Reply: «لِأَن هَذَا الْقرَان عمله فِي تَغْيِير مُقْتَضى الصِّيغَة لَا فِي التَّفْسِير لما هُوَ من محتملات تِلْكَ الصِّيغَة» — "because this attachment works by changing what the form requires, not by specifying something the form could bear", like attaching a condition or a consideration (badal). So in "I divorce you three times", if the wife dies before the number is said, nothing falls: the divorce falls by the number word, not by the base form. (v1/23)
• Objection → Reply: al-Aqraʿ's question shows the form suggests repetition. Reply: he asked because the cause of ḥajj was unclear (the time, which recurs, or the House, which does not). "Had I said yes, it would have become obligatory" shows the obligation would come from that statement, not from the imperative. (v1/22)
• Furūʿ test: "divorce yourself" covers one divorce, or three if he intends the whole, but never two, since two is a bare number. For a slave-wife, two is the whole, so intending two works. "Marry" said to a slave: one wife, or two if intended. (v1/23) Oaths on "water", "food" and "women" follow the same logic of genus: the least, or the whole if intended. (v1/24)

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B2.06 · الأمر المطلق عن الوقت · An unqualified command may be delayed; no immediate performance, but dying after being able to perform, without performing, is culpable (v1/26–30)

• Position: «وَالَّذِي يَصح عِنْدِي فِيهِ من مَذْهَب عُلَمَائِنَا أَنه على التَّرَاخِي» — "What is sound with me as our scholars' position is that it allows delay." (v1/26) Evidence from Muḥammad's rulings: a vowed month of iʿtikāf or fasting may be any month; Ramaḍān make-up days may be done any time; delaying zakāt, ṣadaqat al-fiṭr and ʿushr is not negligence. (v1/26)
• Who: ⚑ «وَكَانَ أَبُو الْحسن الْكَرْخِي يَقُول مُطلق الْأَمر يُوجب الْأَدَاء على الْفَوْر وَهُوَ الظَّاهِر من مَذْهَب الشَّافِعِي» — "al-Karkhī held that the unqualified command requires immediate performance, which is the apparent view of al-Shāfiʿī." (v1/26) Some Shāfiʿīs: suspended until explained. Sarakhsī: "very corrupt". (v1/26)
  • al-Karkhī's arguments: the first moment is agreed to be meant, delay risks loss, and the benefit is known only for the first moment. (v1/26–27)
• Proofs
  1. "Do it now" is a qualified command; making the unqualified one mean the same erases the difference between them. (v1/27)
  2. Performance at any point in life counts as fulfilling the command. (v1/27–28)
• Objection → Reply: "The time of death is unknown, and one who dies after being able to perform is sinful, so delay is not allowed." Reply: delay is permitted on condition that it does not lead to loss, like shooting at game on condition of not hitting a person. Sudden death is rare, and rulings follow the usual case. Hastening remains recommended. (v1/28)
• Ḥajj is not unqualified: it is tied to the ḥajj months. ⚑ Abū Yūsuf: the first year one is able is fixed for it, so delay is loss; Muḥammad: not fixed, delay allowed on condition of not losing it; Abū Ḥanīfa has two reports. (v1/29–30) Sarakhsī calls it "an error" to treat the ḥajj case as the fawr/tarākhī dispute. (v1/29)

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B2.07 · الموقت: الوقت ظرف · A command tied to a time: for prayer, time is container, condition and cause (v1/30–36)

• Position: timed commands are of three kinds: time as container (ẓarf) but not measure, time as measure (miʿyār), and an ambiguous kind. (v1/30) For prayer, «ثمَّ الْوَقْت يكون ظرفا للْأَدَاء وشرطا لَهُ وسببا للْوُجُوب» — "the time is the container of performance, its condition, and the cause of obligation." (v1/30)
  • The cause is not the whole time (then performance would precede its cause), so it is a part. It is the part adjacent to performance: the first part if one prays then; otherwise causation moves forward part by part to the last part. (v1/31, 33)
• Who
  • ⚑ Obligation at the first part, as an extended obligation (wujūban muwassaʿan): Muḥammad b. Shujāʿ, «وَهُوَ الْأَصَح» — "and that is the sounder view". (v1/31)
  • ⚑ «وَأكْثر الْعِرَاقِيّين من مَشَايِخنَا يُنكرُونَ هَذَا» (v1/31) — "Most of the Iraqis among our shaykhs deny this": obligation attaches to the end of the time. Their sub-views: early performance is supererogatory (Sarakhsī: "a clear error"); it is suspended (Sarakhsī: weak); al-Karkhī: it is farḍ, with obligation tied to the end or to the act, which Sarakhsī calls "in reality a return to what we said". (v1/31–32)
  • al-Shāfiʿī: once obligation is fixed, later menses or travel do not change it. (v1/32)
  • ⚑ Zufar: when the time narrows so that it only just fits the prayer, causation fixes on that part. Sarakhsī: weak. (v1/34–35)
• Proofs: obligation (wujūb) differs from the duty to perform now (wujūb al-adāʾ), which follows the demand, as with a deferred price. The sleeper and the unconscious are obliged but not yet addressed with performance. (v1/32–33)
• Furūʿ test: a woman whose menses begin at the end of the time owes no make-up; a traveller at the last part prays two rakʿas. The fajr prayer is spoiled if the sun rises during it, because its causal part was sound and complete. ʿAṣr is valid if the sun sets during it, because its causal part (after the sun reddens) was itself deficient. (v1/33–34)
• Other rules: another prayer may be performed within this time; it needs intention, and an intention specifying the prayer. (v1/35–36)

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B2.08 · الموقت: الوقت معيار · Ramaḍān: the time is the measure, so no other fast is valid in it, except a traveller's intended obligation for Abū Ḥanīfa (v1/36–42)

• Position: the fast of Ramaḍān fills its time, like a measure (kayl) for measured goods, «فَكَانَ الْوَقْت معيارا لَهُ» — "so the time was a measure for it" — and no other fast is lawful or possible in it for a resident. Abū Ḥanīfa qualifies this for a traveller who intends another obligation (see Who). (v1/36)
• Who
  • ⚑ Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad: the traveller who fasts is like the resident, so an intention for another obligation is void and the fast counts for Ramaḍān. Abū Ḥanīfa: the traveller who intends another obligation fasts for what he intended, because he is not bound to perform in this month, and serving his religion is a better use of the dispensation. On an intention for a voluntary fast, Abū Ḥanīfa has two reports. (v1/36–37)
  • The sick person who fasts fasts for Ramaḍān whatever he intends, because his dispensation depends on actual inability. (v1/37)
  • ⚑ Zufar: no intention is needed, since every abstention in it is due. Reply: the fast must be the servant's chosen act, so resolve is required. (v1/37)
  • al-Shāfiʿī: the intention must specify the obligation, and must be made from the night. Reply: in a time where only one fast is lawful, intending "a fast" hits it; an intention made before midday covers most of the day, and most stands for the whole. A fast vowed for a particular day outside Ramaḍān shows the contrast: it is discharged by an unqualified or even a voluntary intention, as Ramaḍān is; but that day was voluntary before the vow, and «فَأَما إِذا نوى وَاجِبا آخر كَانَ عَن ذَلِك الْوَاجِب» — "but if he intends another obligation, it is credited to that obligation" (v1/39) — since the vow's authority makes it obligatory for the vower himself but does not remove the day's standing suitability for another obligation, unlike Ramaḍān, which has no such suitability at all. Make-up (qaḍāʾ) fasting differs again: since it is owed in the person's charge with no tie to a particular day, its intention must cover the entire day, not merely its greater part. (v1/38–41)
• Also: make-up and expiation fasts have the day as their measure but not as their cause, so two days' fasts cannot be done in one day. (v1/42)

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B2.09 · الموقت: المشكل · Ḥajj: an ambiguous case between prayer and fasting (v1/42–44)

• Position: ḥajj resembles prayer (its acts do not fill the time) and fasting (only one ḥajj fits a year). «وَأما الْقسم الثَّالِث وَهُوَ الْمُشكل فوقت الْحَج» — "as for the third kind, the ambiguous one, it is the time of ḥajj." Its time is uncertain: the months of the first year, or any year of life. (v1/42)
  • ⚑ Abū Yūsuf: the first possible year is fixed. Muḥammad: not fixed, delay allowed on condition of not losing it. Both agree that whoever dies after becoming able, without performing it, has lost it and must bequeath it. (v1/42–43)
• Furūʿ test: an intention for a voluntary ḥajj counts as voluntary, not as the obligatory one. al-Shāfiʿī voids the voluntary intention as foolishness, which Sarakhsī rejects because it removes the choice that worship requires. An unqualified intention of ḥajj counts as the obligatory one, by what the circumstances show. (v1/43–44)

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B2.10 · الأداء والقضاء · Performance is handing over the very duty; make-up is discharging it with a like; make-up is owed by the original cause (v1/44–48)

• Definitions: «فالأداء تَسْلِيم عين الْوَاجِب بِسَبَبِهِ إِلَى مُسْتَحقّه» — "Performance is handing the very thing owed, by its cause, to the one entitled." «وَالْقَضَاء إِسْقَاط الْوَاجِب بِمثل من عِنْد الْمَأْمُور هُوَ حَقه» — "Make-up is discharging the duty with a like from the commanded person, which is his own." (v1/44) Example: returning the usurped thing itself is performance; returning a like after it perishes is make-up. (v1/44)
  • Between the two definitions the text cites Q 4:58 and the ḥadīth "render the trust", as proof that "adāʾ" is used for handing over the very thing. (v1/44)
• Who: ⚑ The Iraqis (their statement stands inside the edition's brackets, so it is paraphrased, not quoted): make-up needs a new text (e.g. "a number of other days", "let him pray it when he remembers"). (v1/45)
  • «وَأكْثر مَشَايِخنَا على أَن الْقَضَاء يجب بِالسَّبَبِ الَّذِي بِهِ وَجب الْأَدَاء عِنْد فَوَاته وَهُوَ الْأَصَح» — "Most of our shaykhs hold that make-up is owed by the same cause that made performance owed, once it is missed, and that is sounder." (v1/46)
• Proofs: the point of the act is worship, not the time; only the time's merit is lost, so only that falls. (v1/46) Furūʿ fit this: night prayers made up by day are read aloud, a traveller's prayer made up at home is two rakʿas, and the reverse holds too; the takbīrs of the tashrīq days and the Friday prayer are not made up. (v1/46–47)
• Objection → Reply: the vowed iʿtikāf in Ramaḍān not made up in the next Ramaḍān. Reply: the vow required iʿtikāf, and its fast followed it; once he fasted the first Ramaḍān without doing iʿtikāf, that link broke, and a fast became owed in his charge, which a later Ramaḍān fast cannot discharge. But if he had done neither, the link stays: «حَتَّى إِنَّه لَو لم يصم وَلم يعْتَكف ثمَّ اعْتكف فِي قَضَاء الصَّوْم خرج عَن عُهْدَة الْمَنْذُور» — "so much so that, had he neither fasted nor done iʿtikāf, then done iʿtikāf during the make-up of the fast, he would be discharged of the vow" (v1/47) — which tells against treating make-up as owed by a separate cause. ⚑ Abū Yūsuf, in one report, says the vow lapses instead, since iʿtikāf would remain without a fast. (v1/47–48)

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B2.11 · أنواع الأداء والقضاء · Performance is complete, deficient, or like make-up; make-up is by an understood like or one not understood (v1/48–59)

• Kinds of performance: complete (congregational prayer), deficient (praying alone; the latecomer, masbūq) and performance that resembles make-up (the one who fell asleep behind the imam, lāḥiq). Rulings on recitation and prostration of forgetfulness follow from this. (v1/48–49)
• Make-up by a like not understood: the fidya for the very old instead of fasting, and ḥajj by proxy, are fixed by text and do not extend by analogy. (v1/49–50) Fidya for missed prayer is recommended out of caution, not as a sure discharge: «وَلَكنَّا نرجو الْقبُول من الله فضلا» — "but we hope for acceptance from God, as a favour." (v1/51)
  • ⚑ Paying zakāt in debased coin: Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf say nothing more is owed, since quality has no like apart from the thing; Muḥammad says the difference is owed, out of caution. (v1/50)
  • Ramy (pelting the pillars) has no understood like at all, so it lapses once its time passes. Objection → Reply: why then is a Dam owed for leaving it? Reply: «لَا بطرِيق أَنه مثل للرمي قَائِم مقَامه بل لِأَنَّهُ جبر لنُقْصَان تمكن فِي نُسكه بترك الرَّمْي» — "not because it stands in as a like for ramy, but because it is a repair for a deficiency that occurred in his rite by leaving ramy." A compensatory Dam is not a substitute performance of ramy. (v1/50)
  • Objection → Reply: "You make the sacrifice's value owed as charity after the days of naḥr, putting value in place of the blood by opinion." Reply: the value is owed out of caution, because the purpose may have been feeding the poor; it does not stand in for the blood while the blood is still possible. The purpose may instead be spilling blood, a loss of property: ⚑ a mere diminution (nuqṣān) for Muḥammad, so the giver of a gifted sheep may take it back after it is sacrificed; a destruction (tafwīt) for Abū Yūsuf, so he may not. (v1/51–52)
  • ⚑ The latecomer who joins the imam in rukūʿ in the ʿĪd prayer: Abū Yūsuf, he does not say the ʿĪd takbīrs in rukūʿ, since their place (standing) is gone; Abū Ḥanīfa and Muḥammad, he says them there, since rukūʿ resembles standing. By the same reasoning, the Fātiḥa and sūra omitted in the first two rakʿas are made up (aloud) in the last two; but a Fātiḥa omitted on its own is not, since the later standing is already its place of performance. (v1/52)
• Rights of persons: the same kinds apply to usurpation, sale and dower. (v1/52–59)
  • «وَمن الْأَدَاء الَّذِي هُوَ بِمَنْزِلَة الْقَضَاء حكما» — "Among performance that is, in effect, like make-up": a woman married for a specified slave owned by another, whom the husband then buys and delivers to her — she must accept it, since it is the very thing named in the contract. But if a judge already fixed its value before he acquired it, a later delivery is a mere exchange for that value, and she may refuse it. (v1/55)
  • «وَمن الْقَضَاء الَّذِي هُوَ فِي حكم الْأَدَاء» — "Among make-up that is in the rank of performance": a woman married for an unspecified slave, met instead with its value — she is compelled to accept it, since the named slave was known only in genus. (v1/59)
  • ⚑ A slave sold while his blood was lawful (deficient delivery), then killed for that cause with the buyer: Abū Ḥanīfa, the buyer recovers the whole price, since the loss goes back to the cause of the deficiency; Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad, the lawful blood is a defect, and a loss by a new act at the buyer's does not undo the delivery. (v1/54)
  • ⚑ Debased coin (zuyūf) received as the price in ṣarf or salam and lost before being returned: Abū Ḥanīfa and Muḥammad, he gets nothing back, since quality alone has no like; Abū Yūsuf, «أستحسن أَن يرد مثل الْمَقْبُوض» — "I deem it better that he returns the like of what he received" and claims good coin. (v1/54)
  • ⚑ Value of a fungible that has disappeared from the market: Muḥammad, the last day it existed; Abū Ḥanīfa, the day of the dispute; Abū Yūsuf, the day of usurpation. (v1/55–56)
  • Usufruct (manāfiʿ) is not compensated by property in a pure wrong, since there is no likeness between what lasts and what does not. (v1/56–57)
  • ⚑ Cutting off a man's hand deliberately, then killing him before healing: Abū Ḥanīfa, the heir chooses (cut then kill, or kill), since the first is the like in form and meaning; Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad, only killing, since the killing completes the first act. (v1/57)
  • Ḍamān for a life by property (diya) is by text, "not understood", so it is not extended. Hence no compensation for destroying a right of retaliation or the ownership in marriage. (v1/58–59)

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B2.12 · حسن المأمور به · The command makes its object good by the law, not by reason; the unqualified command gives the highest grade of goodness (v1/60–65)

• Position: «اعْلَم أَن مُطلق مُقْتَضى الْأَمر كَون الْمَأْمُور بِهِ حسنا شرعا» — "The unqualified command requires that what it commands is good by the law." (v1/60)
  • ⚑ «وَلَا نقُول إِنَّه ثَابت عقلا كَمَا زعم بعض مَشَايِخنَا لِأَن الْعقل بِنَفسِهِ غير مُوجب عندنَا» — "We do not say it is established by reason, as some of our shaykhs claimed, because reason by itself does not oblige, in our view." (v1/60)
• Grades of goodness (v1/60–62):
  • Good in itself, never falling: assent of the heart.
  • Good in itself, may fall in some states: confession by the tongue (drops under coercion), prayer, and, "in meaning", zakāt, fasting and ḥajj.
  • Good for something else that is not achieved by the act itself: wuḍūʾ, going to the Friday prayer.
  • Good for something else achieved with it: jihād, the ḥudūd, the funeral prayer.
• Which grade the unqualified command gives: ⚑ some of our shaykhs: only the lower grade (good for something else). Sarakhsī: «وَالأَصَح عِنْدِي أَن بِمُطلق الْأَمر يثبت حسن الْمَأْمُور بِهِ لعَينه شرعا» — "The sounder view with me is that the unqualified command establishes that the commanded thing is good in itself, by the law." (v1/63)
• Permissibility and dislike: the command also establishes permissibility; some theologians deny this, citing one who prays at the last moment believing he is pure, and a spoiled ḥajj. Sarakhsī: «وَهَذَا سَهْو مِنْهُم» — "this is an oversight on their part": the prayer of one who believes he is pure is valid (stated in Kitāb al-Taḥarrī). "Then why must he repeat it, when the command does not require repetition?" «وَوُجُوب الْأَدَاء بعد تبدل الْحَال لَا يكون تَكْرَارا» — "the duty to perform after one's state has changed is not repetition." (v1/63) → B2.05. The spoiled ḥajj stands apart: the command establishes the duty to perform the acts validly; «وَأما بعد الْإِفْسَاد فالثابت وجوب التَّحَلُّل عَن الْإِحْرَام بطريقه وَهَذَا أَمر آخر سوى الأول» — "as for after invalidation, what is established is the duty to be released from iḥrām by its means, and this is another matter besides the first." What that second command requires — completing the acts to exit iḥrām after invalidation — is itself lawful. (v1/64)
• ⚑ Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (al-Jaṣṣāṣ), as reported: a commanded act may still be disliked, e.g. ʿaṣr after the sun reddens, or ṭawāf without wuḍūʾ. Sarakhsī: «وَالأَصَح عِنْدِي أَن بِمُطلق الْأَمر كَمَا تثبت صفة الْجَوَاز وَالْحسن شرعا يثبت انْتِفَاء صفة الْكَرَاهَة» — "The sounder view with me: just as the unqualified command establishes permissibility and goodness, it establishes the absence of dislike." The dislike in those cases attaches to something outside the act. (v1/64)
• When the obligation is lifted: the Iraqis place a dispute here, al-Shāfiʿī holding that permissibility remains (e.g. expiating before breaking an oath; the ʿĀshūrāʾ fast). Sarakhsī (his third "al-aṣaḥḥ ʿindī" in this node, v1/65): once obligation is lifted the command is abrogated entirely; any remaining permissibility comes from the act being lawful anyway. (v1/64–65)

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B2.13 · القدرة شرط الأداء · Capacity conditions performance: minimal capacity for most duties, "facilitating" capacity for some (v1/65–73)

• Position: capacity to perform conditions the duty to perform (Q 2:286), but it need not exist when the command is given. (v1/65–66) «وَهَذَا الشَّرْط نَوْعَانِ مُطلق وكامل» — "This condition is of two kinds: unqualified and complete." (v1/66)
  • Unqualified (minimal) capacity: the least that makes performance possible (water for wuḍūʾ, provision and mount for ḥajj). It is a condition for the duty to arise, not for it to remain. (v1/66–67)
  • «وَأما الْكَامِل مِنْهُ فالقدرة الميسرة للْأَدَاء» — "The complete kind is capacity that makes performance easy." It shapes the duty itself, so it must remain for the duty to remain. (v1/68)
• Furūʿ test
  • Zakāt falls if the property perishes after the duty arose, because it was owed in an easy form (a little from growing wealth). It does not fall if the owner consumes it, since that is a wrong against property already tied to the right. (v1/68)
  • Ḥajj and ṣadaqat al-fiṭr do not fall when the wealth is lost, since only minimal capacity was required. (v1/71)
  • ʿUshr and kharāj fall if the crop is destroyed. Expiation shifts to fasting if the wealth is lost. Zakāt is not owed on wealth equal to one's debts. (v1/69–73)
  • The choice in expiation: «وَالْوَاجِب أحد الْأَنْوَاع عِنْد أهل الْفِقْه بِخِلَاف مَا يَقُوله بعض الْمُتَكَلِّمين أَن الْكل وَاجِب» — "What is owed is one of the kinds, in the view of the jurists, unlike some theologians who say all are owed." Aw under an affirmation gives one; under a negation it generalises, which is why their analogy with prohibition fails. (v1/70) → B6.08
  • ⚑ A debtor who breaks an oath owning 1,000 and owing 1,000, before paying the debt: «فَقَالَ بعض مَشَايِخنَا يكفر بِالصَّوْمِ أَيْضا» (v1/72) — "some of our shaykhs said he expiates by fasting too", since the wealth is taken by his debt; others say he must expiate with money, since expiation is not thanks for wealth like zakāt; Sarakhsī argues with the second ("hence we said"): what counts for expiation by money is the root of ease, not its fullness. (v1/72–73)
  • ⚑ One who becomes eligible in the last part of a prayer time (a convert, a youth reaching puberty): Zufar and al-Shāfiʿī say nothing is owed; "our scholars" say the prayer is owed, by istiḥsān, since capacity need only be conceivable. For a woman whose menses end, this holds only if her days reached ten, «بِأَن تكون أَيَّامهَا عشرَة» — "that is, that her days are ten" — actual purity; or, if her days are fewer than ten, purity is a legal ruling on the blood's stopping, and only if «وَالْبَاقِي من الْوَقْت مِقْدَار مَا يُمكنهَا أَن تَغْتَسِل فِيهِ وَتحرم للصَّلَاة» — "what remains of the time is a measure enough for her to wash in it and enter the prayer." (v1/67)

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B2.14 · خطاب الكفار بالشرائع · Non-Muslims are addressed by faith, penalties, dealings and the next-world reckoning; whether they must perform acts of worship now is disputed among the Ḥanafīs (v1/73–78)

• Agreed: non-Muslims are addressed with faith, with penalties, and with dealings (muʿāmalāt). They are addressed with the rulings as regards punishment in the next life, for denying them. (v1/73)
• Who
  • ⚑ The Iraqis among our shaykhs: they are also obliged to perform in this world, since unbelief cannot earn a lightening of duty; they can perform by first believing, «فَهُوَ نَظِير الْجنب والمحدث يتَمَكَّن من أَدَاء الصَّلَاة بِشَرْط الطَّهَارَة وَهُوَ مطَالب بذلك» — "like the junub and the one in ḥadath, who can perform the prayer on condition of purity and are required to." (v1/74)
  • ⚑ «ومشايخ دِيَارنَا يَقُولُونَ إِنَّهُم لَا يخاطبون بأَدَاء مَا يحْتَمل السُّقُوط من الْعِبَادَات» — "The shaykhs of our lands say they are not addressed with performing acts of worship that can lapse." (v1/74)
  • The text then says: «وَجَوَاب هَذِه الْمَسْأَلَة غير مَحْفُوظ من الْمُتَقَدِّمين من أَصْحَابنَا نصا» — "The answer to this question is not preserved from our early authorities as an explicit statement." Only their rulings point to it. (v1/74)
• Inferences Sarakhsī rejects as weak (v1/75): no make-up of prayers after apostasy (that follows from "Islam wipes out what came before"); repeating a prayer after apostasy (that follows from apostasy voiding deeds); "the rulings are not part of faith" (they are addressed with penalties, which are not part of faith either).
• The inference he accepts: a wording in the Kitāb (the school's text; the page names no author, and calls it "like an explicit statement from our colleagues") — «من نذر أَن يَصُوم شهرا ثمَّ ارْتَدَّ ثمَّ أسلم فَلَيْسَ عَلَيْهِ من الصَّوْم الْمَنْذُور شَيْء» — "whoever vows to fast a month, then apostatizes, then returns to Islam, owes nothing of the vowed fast" — "because apostasy voids every act of worship". That can only mean it voids the duty to perform, so it is "like an explicit statement". (v1/75)
• Proofs: the Muʿādh ḥadīth makes the duty to pray follow acceptance of faith (v1/76). Worship is commanded so that the doer earns reward, and the unbeliever is not fit for that reward, so he is not fit to perform. (v1/76–77)
• Objection → Reply: the junub analogy. Reply: «وَهَذَا بِخِلَاف الْجنب والمحدث فِي الْخطاب بأَدَاء الصَّلَاة لِأَن الْأَهْلِيَّة لما هُوَ مَوْعُود للمصلين لَا يَنْعَدِم بالجنابة وَالْحَدَث» — "the junub and the one in ḥadath differ, because fitness for what is promised to those who pray is not lost by janāba or ḥadath"; purity is only a condition of performance. So "free your slave on my behalf for 1,000" is valid though the asker lacks ownership (a condition), while a master's "free a slave on your own behalf" to his slave is void, since the slave lacks the capacity itself. (v1/77)
• Objection → Reply: "Then unbelief lightens their burden." Reply: it is an aggravation, not a lightening. Like a doctor who stops prescribing medicine to a patient he has given up on, excluding them from the duty expresses the weight of their state; they remain punished for it. (v1/77–78) Muḥammad's reason in denying them expiation: «مَا فِيهِ من الشّرك أعظم من ذَلِك» — "the shirk in him is greater than that." (v1/78)
• Aside: Sarakhsī rejects "one of our contemporaries whose word is not relied on", who wrote that a Muslim who denies one ruling is an unbeliever in that and a believer otherwise. He calls it contrary to the explicit report from the early Ḥanafīs, citing Muḥammad in al-Siyar al-kabīr. (v1/73) [The turath text of this passage is scrambled across the v1/73–74 seam, so it is paraphrased and not quoted.]
• [Editorial] Debate note: This is the Ḥanafī locus of "are the kuffār addressed by the furūʿ?". Sarakhsī's own report is that the Iraqis and "the shaykhs of our lands" differ, and that the early imams left no explicit ruling on it. Cite it as such, not as "the Ḥanafī view".

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