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B3 · باب النهي · Prohibition (nahy), the causes behind rulings, the grades farḍ to nafl, and strict rules and concessions (v1/78–124)

1. In short
2. Why it matters
3. B3.01 · موجب النهي · A prohibition requires abstaining, and makes the forbidden thing bad by the law
4. B3.02 · مراتب القبح · A forbidden thing is bad in itself, bad for something next to it, or bad for something joined to it as a description
5. B3.03 · النهي عن التصرفات الشرعية · Forbidding a legal act for a joined description leaves it legitimate but makes the performance defective, unless the two cannot coexist
6. B3.04 · الأمر والنهي في أضدادهما · A command makes its opposite disliked, and a prohibition may make its opposite a sunna close to wājib, both by implication
7. B3.05 · أسباب الشرائع · God alone obliges; the law set visible causes so that duties can be recognised, and each duty follows its cause
8. B3.06 · أقسام المشروعات · Legislated acts are farḍ, wājib, sunna or nafl; wājib is the Ḥanafī grade between farḍ and sunna
9. B3.07 · العزيمة والرخصة · ʿAzīma is the original ruling; rukhṣa is what an excuse permits while the forbidding proof remains

In short

• A prohibition requires abstaining and makes the forbidden thing bad by the law [B3.01]. Forbidding a legal act for a description joined to it leaves it, as a rule, legitimate but defective [B3.03]. Rulings rest on visible causes God set [B3.05], and come in four grades: farḍ, wājib, sunna, nafl [B3.06].

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Why it matters

• Because a forbidden sale stays legitimate at root, a defective sale still gives ownership once the goods are taken, though it must be undone [B3.03].

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B3.01 · موجب النهي · A prohibition requires abstaining, and makes the forbidden thing bad by the law

• In plain words: What does "do not!" require of you? Sarakhsī says a prohibition (nahy) requires you to refrain from the forbidden act, since it is the opposite of a command. It also shows that the forbidden thing is bad by the law, as a command shows that its object is good. What it requires is abstaining, which is not itself an act: it spans your whole life, even before you learn of the prohibition. Leaving becomes an act only when you are tempted and choose to leave.
• Example: "If I do not wish to divorce you, you are divorced", then "I do not wish": no divorce, since not wishing spans his whole life. "If I refuse to divorce you, you are divorced", then "I refuse": she is divorced, since refusing is an act.
• Who disagrees: Some asked why the prohibition should not show that refraining is good. Sarakhsī answers that then a command and a prohibition would show the same thing.
• Deeper: v1 B3.01

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B3.02 · مراتب القبح · A forbidden thing is bad in itself, bad for something next to it, or bad for something joined to it as a description

• In plain words: Is everything forbidden bad in the same way? Sarakhsī names three grades. Some things are bad in themselves, and are not legitimate at all: prayer without purity, or selling an unborn animal. Some are bad only because of something next to them, and stay valid despite the prohibition: selling at the time of the Friday call, or praying on usurped land. Some are bad for something joined to them as a description: ribā, where the required equality is lost, or fasting on the ʿĪd days. Sensory acts of that third kind, like zinā and drinking wine, count as bad in themselves, which is why ḥadd penalties attach to them; the dispute is over contracts and acts of worship (B3.03).
• Example: Intercourse during menses is forbidden only for something next to it, so it still makes a thrice-divorced woman lawful again for her first husband.
• Deeper: v1 B3.02

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B3.03 · النهي عن التصرفات الشرعية · Forbidding a legal act for a joined description leaves it legitimate but makes the performance defective, unless the two cannot coexist

• In plain words: If the law forbids a sale or a fast for something joined to it, does the act still exist in law? The Ḥanafī scholars say the act stays legitimate at root, and the person's performance becomes defective (fāsid). The exception is where being forbidden and the act surviving cannot go together. Then the act ceases, and that is abrogation in the form of a prohibition, not a true prohibition. Sarakhsī cites Muḥammad's argument that forbidding what cannot exist is idle, like telling the blind "do not see".
• Example: A sale defective for such a reason still gives the buyer ownership once he takes the goods, but an unlawful ownership that must be undone. Marriage differs: what a husband gains is only the lawfulness of intimacy, so an unlawful marriage gives nothing.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī says the unqualified prohibition abrogates such an act, so it is not legitimate at all: what God forbids He does not approve. Sarakhsī answers that a prohibition needs something real to refrain from; abrogation removes the act, while prohibition forbids doing what remains legitimate.
• Deeper: v1 B3.03

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B3.04 · الأمر والنهي في أضدادهما · A command makes its opposite disliked, and a prohibition may make its opposite a sunna close to wājib, both by implication

• In plain words: If God commands standing, is sitting then forbidden? Sarakhsī gives as the preferred Ḥanafī view that a command makes its opposite disliked, not forbidden. This comes by implication (iqtiḍāʾ, what the words necessarily presuppose), not by the text itself, and implication gives only what necessity needs. In the same way, a prohibition may make its opposite a sunna as strong as a wājib.
• Example: One commanded to stand in prayer who sits does not void his prayer, since he can still stand afterwards; but the sitting itself is disliked.
• Who disagrees: Some theologians say a command says nothing about its opposite. Sarakhsī answers that implication is a valid route, and what is implied is by definition not stated. ⚑ al-Jaṣṣāṣ said a command forbids its opposite, building on his view that commands must be done at once; Sarakhsī answers that this premise is only a claim.
• Deeper: v1 B3.04; B2.06

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B3.05 · أسباب الشرائع · God alone obliges; the law set visible causes so that duties can be recognised, and each duty follows its cause

• In plain words: If God is the one who obliges, why speak of "causes" of rulings? Sarakhsī says God alone truly obliges; the causes (sabab, a visible occasion the law ties a duty to) have no power of their own. God set them to make things easy for His servants. The duty itself falls on a person without any act of his; the duty to perform comes with being addressed. A cause is known when the duty is named after it and recurs as it recurs.
• Example: Prayer's cause is its time, fasting's is the month, ḥajj's is the House, and zakāt's is growing wealth of a set amount (niṣāb). So a sleeper, or one unconscious for a day and a night or less, is obliged and must make up the prayer.
• Who disagrees: A later author made only the days of Ramaḍān the cause of fasting. Sarakhsī calls this an error: the whole month, nights and days, is the cause.
• Deeper: v1 B3.05

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B3.06 · أقسام المشروعات · Legislated acts are farḍ, wājib, sunna or nafl; wājib is the Ḥanafī grade between farḍ and sunna

• In plain words: Why do Ḥanafīs have a grade called wājib between farḍ and sunna? Farḍ is fixed by certain proof: denying it is unbelief, while omitting it is sin, not unbelief, unless out of contempt. Wājib binds in practice but rests on proof that is not certain, such as a single report, so denying it is not unbelief. Sunna is the path set by the Prophet and, for the Ḥanafīs, by the Companions after him. Nafl is an extra act "for us, not against us": it adds to our credit and cannot count against us, so it may be prayed sitting. Treating what a single report adds as farḍ would raise the report above its rank, since adding to a text is abrogation.
• Example: Recitation in prayer is farḍ by the Qurʾān (Q 73:20); the Fātiḥa in particular comes by single report, so it is wājib. Witr is wājib, not farḍ.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī denies the wājib grade and merges it into farḍ. Sarakhsī answers that if the dispute is over the name, the name has been explained; if over the ruling, the difference in the proof forces it.
• Deeper: v1 B3.06; B11.08

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B3.07 · العزيمة والرخصة · ʿAzīma is the original ruling; rukhṣa is what an excuse permits while the forbidding proof remains

• In plain words: What separates a strict rule from a concession? The strict rule (ʿazīma) is what is legislated from the start. A concession (rukhṣa) is what is allowed for an excuse while the forbidding proof still stands. Sarakhsī names four grades. In two, the forbidding cause remains. Under coercion to utter unbelief, holding firm is better; a traveller's fast in Ramaḍān is better, unless he fears death. In the other two, the name is used loosely, since the cause no longer applies. Examples: the burdens lifted from this community, and eating carrion in dire need, which one must do.
• Example: A traveller may not pray four rakʿas, because the cause no longer requires more than two of him. The extra two would be voluntary; mixing them into the farḍ on purpose is unlawful, and without sitting after the second rakʿa the prayer is spoiled.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī says four is still required and the traveller may choose. Sarakhsī answers with ʿUmar's ḥadīth, "a charity God has given you, so accept His charity": a remission from the one entitled cannot be refused, so the cause no longer requires four.
• Deeper: v1 B3.07

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