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B2 · باب الأمر · Command (amr): what it is, what it obliges, when and how often (v1/11–78)

1. In short
2. Why it matters
3. B2.01 · حقيقة الأمر وصيغته · A command (amr) is the imperative "do!" said to an equal or inferior; an act is called a command only figuratively
4. B2.02 · أي معاني الصيغة أمر حقيقة · The imperative has seven uses; only obligation is a command in the proper sense
5. B2.03 · موجب الأمر المطلق · An unqualified command obliges, unless evidence shows otherwise
6. B2.04 · الأمر بعد الحظر · A command that comes after a prohibition still obliges, unless evidence shows otherwise
7. B2.05 · الأمر والتكرار · A command asks for the act once; it neither requires repetition nor admits it, though it may cover the whole of its kind
8. B2.06 · الأمر المطلق عن الوقت · A command with no set time may be delayed, but not until it is lost
9. B2.07 · الموقت: الوقت ظرف · For prayer, the time is its container, its condition and the cause that makes it owed
10. B2.08 · الموقت: الوقت معيار · The Ramaḍān fast fills its whole time, so no other fast is valid in it for a resident
11. B2.09 · الموقت: المشكل · Ḥajj's time is an uncertain case, between prayer and fasting
12. B2.10 · الأداء والقضاء · Performance hands over the very thing owed; make-up discharges it with a like, and is owed by the same cause
13. B2.11 · أنواع الأداء والقضاء · Performance can be complete, deficient, or in effect a make-up; make-up is by a like we understand, or by one fixed only by text
14. B2.12 · حسن المأمور به · A command makes its object good by the law, not by reason, and good in itself
15. B2.13 · القدرة شرط الأداء · Capacity is a condition of performing: the minimum for most duties, an easy capacity for some
16. B2.14 · خطاب الكفار بالشرائع · Non-Muslims are addressed with faith, penalties, dealings and the punishment of the next life; whether they must perform worship now is disputed among the Ḥanafīs

In short

• This chapter asks what God's command requires of us [Overview]. An unqualified command obliges, unless evidence shows otherwise [B2.03]. It asks for the act once, not repeatedly [B2.05], and allows delay, so long as the duty is not lost [B2.06]. A command tied to a time works differently for prayer, fasting and ḥajj [B2.07].

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Why it matters

• Because a command asks for the act once, the rule "if you enter the house you are divorced" divorces her only once, however often she enters [B2.05].

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B2.01 · حقيقة الأمر وصيغته · A command (amr) is the imperative "do!" said to an equal or inferior; an act is called a command only figuratively

• In plain words: What is a command, a form of words or also an action? Sarakhsī says a command is one kind of speech, like a statement or a question: saying "do!" to another. The jurists add rank: said to a superior it is a request, not a command. What a command intends is known from this form alone, in the view of most jurists. When people call a deed "amr", that is a figure of speech.
• Example: The Prophet asked the Companions why they took off their sandals when he did. So his act alone did not bind them to copy it.
• Who disagrees: Some followers of Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī say a command's intent can be known without the form. Sarakhsī answers that no one who merely does an act is called "one who commands", and that one can truly say "I commanded nothing today" after doing many things. Whether the Prophet's acts bind is a later question.
• Deeper: v1 B2.01; B12.01

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B2.02 · أي معاني الصيغة أمر حقيقة · The imperative has seven uses; only obligation is a command in the proper sense

• In plain words: Is every use of the imperative a command? It is used for obligation, recommendation, permission, guidance, challenge, rebuke and request. No one disputes that obligation is, and that request, rebuke and challenge are not. For recommendation, permission and guidance, Sarakhsī sides with al-Karkhī and al-Jaṣṣāṣ, two Ḥanafī shaykhs: they are called commands only figuratively. The Arabs call one who abandons a command "disobedient", and no one is disobedient for leaving what is merely recommended or permitted.
• Example: "God did not command me to fast six days of Shawwāl" is true; "God did not command me to fast Ramaḍān" is false. So the Shawwāl fast is recommended, not commanded.
• Who disagrees: Some Shāfiʿīs call a recommendation a command, since doing it earns reward. Sarakhsī answers that reward comes from acting against one's desire for God's pleasure, which needs no command.
• Deeper: v1 B2.02

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B2.03 · موجب الأمر المطلق · An unqualified command obliges, unless evidence shows otherwise

• In plain words: When God or the Prophet simply says "do!", with nothing else, is it an obligation, a recommendation, or unclear? Most jurists say it obliges unless there is evidence otherwise, and Sarakhsī defends this. The Companions acted on the Prophet's commands without asking for more, even those who received only his words. A command asks for the act in the strongest way short of forcing it, and that is obligation.
• Example: The Prophet rebuked Ubayy b. Kaʿb for not answering his call at once, citing only "respond to God and the Messenger" (Q 8:24). So answering his call was binding.
• Who disagrees: Ibn Surayj, a Shāfiʿī, said the meaning must wait for an explanation; most Shāfiʿīs rejected his claim that this was al-Shāfiʿī's view. Sarakhsī answers that then a prohibition would also wait, and command and prohibition would be the same. Some Mālikīs say it gives only permission, others recommendation; he answers that the unqualified form asks for the fullest kind of demand, which is obligation.
• Deeper: v1 B2.03

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B2.04 · الأمر بعد الحظر · A command that comes after a prohibition still obliges, unless evidence shows otherwise

• In plain words: If God first forbids something and then commands it, does the command oblige or only permit? Sarakhsī calls it the sound view that it still obliges, whenever performance is possible, unless evidence prevents it. The command's own work is to ask for the act; lifting the earlier ban is only a side effect.
• Example: After the Friday prayer, "disperse through the land" (Q 62:10): leaving is lawful, but that permission comes from other texts, such as "God has made trade lawful", not from the imperative itself.
• Who disagrees: Some Shāfiʿīs say a command after a prohibition gives permission only, citing this verse and "hunt" after leaving iḥrām (Q 5:2). Sarakhsī answers that in both cases the permission rests on other texts.
• Deeper: v1 B2.04

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B2.05 · الأمر والتكرار · A command asks for the act once; it neither requires repetition nor admits it, though it may cover the whole of its kind

• In plain words: Does "do!" mean do it once, or again and again? Sarakhsī gives as the sound position of the Ḥanafī scholars that the command form neither requires repetition nor admits it. It asks for the least of its kind, with the whole of the kind as a possibility the speaker may intend. A second doing is a new act, not a repetition of the first. Prayers and fasts recur because their causes recur, not because of the command.
• Example: "Divorce yourself" lets her divorce once, or three times if he intends the whole, but never twice, since two is neither one divorce nor the whole of three. For a wife who is a slave, two is her whole, so intending two counts.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ Some Ḥanafī shaykhs said a command tied to a condition repeats with the condition. Sarakhsī says this is not the Ḥanafī position: "if you enter the house you are divorced" divorces her only once, however often she enters. al-Shāfiʿī says the form does not require repetition but can bear it; Sarakhsī answers that adding a number changes what the form requires, rather than explaining it.
• Deeper: v1 B2.05

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B2.06 · الأمر المطلق عن الوقت · A command with no set time may be delayed, but not until it is lost

• In plain words: If a command sets no time, must you do it at once? Sarakhsī gives as the sound Ḥanafī position that you may delay it. Doing it at any point in life fulfils the command, and "do it now" would otherwise mean the same as plain "do it". But delay is allowed only on condition that it does not end in loss: one who dies after he was able to perform, without performing, is at fault. Hastening stays recommended.
• Example: Muḥammad ruled that a vowed month of fasting may be any month. Missed Ramaḍān days may be made up at any time, and delaying zakāt is not negligence.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ al-Karkhī, a Ḥanafī shaykh, held that such a command must be done at once, which is also the apparent view of al-Shāfiʿī. His reason: only the first moment is surely meant, and delay risks loss. Sarakhsī answers that delay is allowed on the condition of not losing it, like shooting at game on the condition of not hitting a person.
• Deeper: v1 B2.06

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B2.07 · الموقت: الوقت ظرف · For prayer, the time is its container, its condition and the cause that makes it owed

• In plain words: When a command has a set time, how does the time work? For prayer, the time is a container larger than the act, a condition of performing it, and the cause that makes it owed. The prayer is owed from the first part, with a wide window; Muḥammad b. Shujāʿ, a Ḥanafī, held this, and Sarakhsī calls it sounder. But the part that counts as the cause is the part joined to the prayer; if you have not yet prayed, it moves forward to the last part. Your state at that part decides what is owed.
• Example: A woman whose period begins at the end of the time owes no make-up of that prayer. A resident who sets out on a journey in the last part of the time prays two rakʿas.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ Most of the Iraqi Ḥanafīs said the prayer is owed only at the end of the time. al-Shāfiʿī says that once it is owed, a later period or journey does not change it.
• Deeper: v1 B2.07

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B2.08 · الموقت: الوقت معيار · The Ramaḍān fast fills its whole time, so no other fast is valid in it for a resident

• In plain words: Can you keep a different fast during Ramaḍān? Sarakhsī says the Ramaḍān fast fills its time the way a measure fills with what it measures. So for a resident no other fast is lawful or even possible in it: whatever fast he intends counts for Ramaḍān. The fast must still be his chosen act, so he must intend to fast. Intending simply "a fast" is enough, and an intention made before midday covers most of the day, which stands for the whole.
• Example: A resident who intends a different obligatory fast in Ramaḍān has fasted Ramaḍān; the other intention counts for nothing.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ Abū Ḥanīfa says a traveller who intends another obligation fasts for what he intended, since he is not bound to fast this month. Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad say it counts for Ramaḍān, as for a resident. ⚑ Zufar says no intention is needed at all. al-Shāfiʿī requires an intention that names the obligation, made from the night.
• Deeper: v1 B2.08

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B2.09 · الموقت: المشكل · Ḥajj's time is an uncertain case, between prayer and fasting

• In plain words: Is ḥajj timed like prayer or like fasting? It is like prayer in that its acts do not fill its time, and like fasting in that only one ḥajj fits a year. Its time is uncertain: the ḥajj months of the first year one is able, or any year of one's life. But whoever becomes able and dies without performing it has lost it, and must leave a bequest for it.
• Example: An intention for a voluntary ḥajj counts as voluntary, not as the obligatory one. An unqualified intention of ḥajj counts as the obligatory one, as the circumstances show.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ Abū Yūsuf says the first year one is able is fixed for it. Muḥammad says it is not, and delay is allowed on condition of not losing it. Abū Ḥanīfa has two reports. al-Shāfiʿī treats a voluntary intention as the obligatory ḥajj; Sarakhsī answers that this removes the choice that worship needs.
• Deeper: v1 B2.09; B2.06

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B2.10 · الأداء والقضاء · Performance hands over the very thing owed; make-up discharges it with a like, and is owed by the same cause

• In plain words: What is the difference between doing a duty on time (adāʾ) and making it up later (qaḍāʾ)? Performance hands over the very thing owed. Make-up discharges it with something like it. Most Ḥanafī shaykhs, and Sarakhsī calls this sounder, say make-up is owed by the same cause that made the performance owed. The point of the act is worship, not the time, so only the time's merit is lost.
• Example: Night prayers made up by day must still be recited aloud, and a traveller's prayer made up at home is still two rakʿas.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ The Iraqi Ḥanafīs said make-up needs a new text of its own, such as "a number of other days" for missed fasts.
• In his words: "Performance is handing the very thing owed, by its cause, to the one entitled": «فالأداء تَسْلِيم عين الْوَاجِب بِسَبَبِهِ إِلَى مُسْتَحقّه» (v1/44)
• Deeper: v1 B2.10

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B2.11 · أنواع الأداء والقضاء · Performance can be complete, deficient, or in effect a make-up; make-up is by a like we understand, or by one fixed only by text

• In plain words: Are all performances and make-ups equal? No. Performance may be complete, like praying in congregation, deficient, like praying alone, or in effect a make-up, like one who slept behind the imam. Make-up is by a like we can understand, as in B2.10: a missed prayer made up by a prayer. Or it is by a like we cannot understand, fixed only by a text. What is fixed only by a text is not extended by qiyās.
• Example: Feeding the poor (fidya) instead of fasting, for the very old, is fixed by a text, so it is not extended to missed prayers by qiyās. Fidya for missed prayers is only recommended, out of caution, "hoping for acceptance from God".
• Who disagrees: ⚑ For zakāt paid in debased coin, Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf say nothing more is owed, since quality has no like of its own. Muḥammad says the difference is owed, out of caution.
• Deeper: v1 B2.11

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B2.12 · حسن المأمور به · A command makes its object good by the law, not by reason, and good in itself

• In plain words: Is an act good because God commands it, or does He command it because reason sees it is good? Sarakhsī says the command shows the act is good by the law; reason by itself does not oblige. He also calls it sounder that an unqualified command shows the act is good in itself, not just good for something else. It also shows the act is permitted and, on his sounder view, not disliked; any dislike comes from something outside the act.
• Example: Assent of the heart is good in itself and never falls. Wuḍūʾ is good for the sake of the prayer. One who prays believing he is pure has prayed validly, and must pray again only because his state has changed.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ Some Ḥanafī shaykhs said goodness is known by reason; others, that an unqualified command shows only goodness for something else. ⚑ al-Jaṣṣāṣ held that a commanded act may still be disliked, like ʿaṣr after the sun reddens. Sarakhsī answers that the dislike attaches to something outside the act.
• Deeper: v1 B2.12

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B2.13 · القدرة شرط الأداء · Capacity is a condition of performing: the minimum for most duties, an easy capacity for some

• In plain words: If you lose the means after a duty became owed, does the duty go? Capacity is a condition of performing (Q 2:286), of two kinds. For most duties, minimal capacity is needed only for the duty to arise, not to remain. For some, like zakāt, the capacity is one that makes the duty easy, and it must remain for the duty to remain.
• Example: Zakāt falls if the wealth perishes after it was owed, since it was owed in an easy form; it does not fall if the owner uses it up himself. Ḥajj and ṣadaqat al-fiṭr need only the minimum, so they do not fall when the wealth is lost.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ Suppose someone becomes eligible in the last moments of a prayer time, like a new Muslim. Zufar and al-Shāfiʿī say nothing is owed. The Ḥanafī scholars say the prayer is owed, by istiḥsān, since capacity need only be conceivable.
• Deeper: v1 B2.13

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B2.14 · خطاب الكفار بالشرائع · Non-Muslims are addressed with faith, penalties, dealings and the punishment of the next life; whether they must perform worship now is disputed among the Ḥanafīs

• In plain words: Are non-Muslims bound by the detailed rules of Islam? All agree they are addressed with faith, with penalties, with dealings, and with punishment in the next life for denying the rules. The Ḥanafīs differ on whether they must also perform acts of worship now. Sarakhsī reports that the early imams left no explicit answer; only their rulings point to one.
• Example: A text of the school (the Kitāb) says whoever vows to fast a month, then leaves Islam, then returns, owes nothing of the vow. Apostasy voids the duty to perform acts of worship. Sarakhsī takes this as the one sound pointer.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ The Iraqi Ḥanafīs say non-Muslims must perform now, and can by first believing, as one who is impure must purify for prayer. The shaykhs of Sarakhsī's own region say they are not addressed with performing acts of worship, that is, duties that can fall away from a person, unlike faith. Sarakhsī answers the Iraqis that impurity does not remove fitness for the reward of prayer, while unbelief does.
• Deeper: v1 B2.14

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