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B18 · باب أقسام الأحكام وأسبابها وعللها وشروطها وعلاماتها · Kinds of rulings, and the causes, effective causes, conditions and signs they hang on (v2/289–332)

1. In short
2. Why it matters
3. B18.01 · أقسام الحقوق · Rights are purely God's, purely people's, or mixed with one side dominant; God's pure rights run from pure worship to pure penalty
4. B18.02 · الأصل والخلف · A substitute is owed by the same cause as the original, only if that cause first met its object, and it takes over only when the original cannot be performed
5. B18.03 · تعريف السبب والعلة والشرط والعلامة · A cause (sabab) is a path to the ruling; an effective cause (ʿilla) brings it about; a condition (sharṭ) is what it exists at; a sign (ʿalāma) only makes it known
6. B18.04 · تقسيم السبب · Four kinds of cause (sabab): figurative, pure, one that works as an effective cause (ʿilla), and one that resembles an effective cause
7. B18.05 · تقسيم العلة · Six kinds of effective cause (ʿilla), by whether it has the name, the meaning, and the effect
8. B18.06 · تقسيم الشرط والعلامة · Kinds of condition (sharṭ), from pure to name only, and kinds of sign (ʿalāma)

In short

• This chapter sorts the rulings and what they hang on [Overview]. Rights are God's, people's, or mixed [B18.01]. A substitute is owed by the same cause as the original [B18.02]. A ruling may hang on a cause (sabab), an effective cause (ʿilla), a condition (sharṭ) or a sign (ʿalāma), each with its own kinds [B18.03].

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Why it matters

• Who pays when a cause, a condition and someone's free choice combine turns on these labels: a well-digger owes blood-money only if the digging was a wrong, and not if someone pushed the victim in [B18.04].

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B18.01 · أقسام الحقوق · Rights are purely God's, purely people's, or mixed with one side dominant; God's pure rights run from pure worship to pure penalty

• In plain words: Whose right is a given ruling, and why does that matter? Sarakhsī sorts rulings into four: purely God's rights, purely people's rights, mixed with God's right dominant, and mixed with people's right dominant. God's pure rights include pure worship (faith, prayer, zakāt, fasting, ḥajj) and pure penalties (the ḥudūd). Between them lie expiations, part worship and part penalty, and levies such as the tithe and the land tax (kharāj). The ḥadd for slander is mixed with God's right dominant; retaliation is mixed with people's right dominant, so inheritance, pardon and settlement apply to it.
• Example: In most expiations worship dominates; the Ramaḍān expiation leans to penalty, so doubts drop it. One who alone saw the new moon, and whose testimony the imam rejected, owes no expiation for breaking that day's fast.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī makes expiations owed by way of liability. Sarakhsī answers that liability repairs a loss, and God suffers none.
• Deeper: v1 B18.01

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B18.02 · الأصل والخلف · A substitute is owed by the same cause as the original, only if that cause first met its object, and it takes over only when the original cannot be performed

• In plain words: When is a substitute, like tayammum for wuḍūʾ, owed? Sarakhsī says a substitute is owed by what makes the original owed. The cause must first have met its object, and the ruling passes to the substitute only when the original cannot be performed. For the Ḥanafīs tayammum is a full substitute that acts like the original while the inability lasts. It can also be a substitute of necessity while water is present, when wuḍūʾ would mean missing a funeral or ʿīd prayer.
• Example: Tears, spit and sweat do not require wuḍūʾ, so they do not require tayammum. A false oath (ghamūs, swearing to a past thing one knows is untrue) could never be kept, so it never bound keeping, and owes no expiation. An oath to touch the sky is about a future act, so keeping it is conceivable in kind; it binds keeping, and when broken owes expiation.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī makes tayammum only a substitute of necessity, so it cannot come before the prayer's time and serves one obligatory prayer. The Ḥanafīs answer that it acts as the original while the inability lasts.
• Deeper: v1 B18.02

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B18.03 · تعريف السبب والعلة والشرط والعلامة · A cause (sabab) is a path to the ruling; an effective cause (ʿilla) brings it about; a condition (sharṭ) is what it exists at; a sign (ʿalāma) only makes it known

• In plain words: What exactly does a ruling "hang on"? Sarakhsī defines four words. A cause (sabab) is a path to the ruling that does not itself reach it, like the road to Mecca. An effective cause (ʿilla) changes the state by occurring in it, like sale for ownership. A condition (sharṭ) is what the ruling exists at, not by: the ruling comes when it is present, but it does not bring the ruling about. A sign (ʿalāma) only makes the ruling known, like a milestone. Behind all of them, the binding is God's; the Law made visible causes into effective causes for us, for ease.
• Example: "If you enter the house, you are divorced": entering is the condition. So witnesses to the entering who retract owe nothing, while witnesses to the suspended divorce who retract after the entering are liable.
• In his words: "None makes anything binding but God": «لَا مُوجب إِلَّا الله» (v2/302)
• Deeper: v1 B18.03

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B18.04 · تقسيم السبب · Four kinds of cause (sabab): figurative, pure, one that works as an effective cause (ʿilla), and one that resembles an effective cause

• In plain words: Is everyone who "causes" a harm liable? Sarakhsī names four kinds of cause. A figurative cause is a cause in form only, like an oath before it is broken. A pure cause only opens a path, and someone's free choice in between brings the result: one who unties a slave's shackle is not liable when the slave runs away. A cause that works as an effective cause, like leading or driving an animal, brings liability, though not expiation or loss of inheritance. A cause that resembles an effective cause, like a well dug in the road, brings blood-money when the digging was a wrong, unless someone pushed the victim in.
• Example: A muḥrim who points out game owes nothing before the game is killed, since it may yet hide and be safe again. Once it is killed he is liable, having broken the safety from him that he owed game by entering iḥrām.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī treats witnesses for retaliation as a strong cause that brings retaliation on them. The Ḥanafīs answer that the qāḍī judges by his own choice, so it stays a cause, and retaliation needs direct action.
• Deeper: v1 B18.04

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B18.05 · تقسيم العلة · Six kinds of effective cause (ʿilla), by whether it has the name, the meaning, and the effect

• In plain words: Does every effective cause act at once? Sarakhsī sorts them by three marks: name, meaning (bringing the ruling about) and effect (the ruling attaching at it). A real one has all three, like sale or marriage. Some have the name only, like an unbroken oath. Some have name and meaning but a delayed effect, like a sale suspended on ratification. Some have name and effect but stand in for a hidden meaning. Sleep lying down or reclining counts as ḥadath (the state that breaks wuḍūʾ): the posture shows the joints relaxed, and stands in for something leaving the body.
• Example: Zakāt paid before the year ends counts once the year completes, since the nisāb exists and only its growth over the year is awaited.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ Ḥanafī shaykhs differ whether a real one's ruling may lag behind it; Sarakhsī's soundest view is that it may not. ⚑ Some put a vow for a future time with the effective causes that resemble a cause (sabab). He puts it with those whose effect is delayed: a vow to give a dirham tomorrow may be given today.
• Deeper: v1 B18.05

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B18.06 · تقسيم الشرط والعلامة · Kinds of condition (sharṭ), from pure to name only, and kinds of sign (ʿalāma)

• In plain words: Is a condition ever treated like the cause? A pure condition only lets the cause work: worship waits on knowing the command, and prayer on intention and purity. Some conditions count as an effective cause when nothing independent comes between: a wound that spreads into death counts as direct killing, and brings retaliation if it was intentional. Others count only as a cause, when a free choice comes between. A condition in name only is the first of two conditions ("if you enter these two houses"); nothing hangs on it. A sign only shows the ruling. Iḥṣān (the status at which a fornicator is stoned rather than flogged) does not cause the stoning; it shows that this zinā called for it. So iḥṣān gained after the zinā does not bring stoning.
• Example: Witnesses to iḥṣān who retract owe nothing, since iḥṣān is only a sign.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī makes the slanderer's failure to bring four witnesses only a sign for rejecting his testimony, which the slander itself voids. The Ḥanafīs answer that it is a condition of both the flogging and the rejection (Q 24:4).
• Deeper: v1 B18.06

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