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B12 · باب الكلام في أفعال النبي وما يتصل به · The Prophet's acts and reasoning, earlier prophets' law, and the Companions' and Followers' opinions (v2/86–118)

1. In short
2. Why it matters
3. B12.01 · أفعال النبي · If we do not know whether the Prophet did something as a duty or not, following him in it is permitted until it is shown to be his alone
4. B12.02 · اجتهاد النبي · Where no revelation came, the Prophet waited for it, then judged by his own reasoning; a judgment God left uncorrected is certain proof
5. B12.03 · فعله الموافق للكتاب · When something the Prophet did or said matches the Qurʾān, it explains the verse; it is not a new ruling
6. B12.04 · الزمان والمكان في الفعل المبين · When the Prophet's act explains a command, the time and place of the act are not part of the rule, unless the text itself is unclear about them
7. B12.05 · شرائع من قبلنا · An earlier prophet's law binds us as our Prophet's law, until abrogated, but only when known through the Qurʾān or the Prophet
8. B12.06 · قول الصحابي · A lone Companion's opinion, when no Companion is known to differ, is proof where qiyās cannot reach; ⚑ on the sounder view it also outranks qiyās
9. B12.07 · أصحابنا المتمسكون بالسنة والرأي · Sarakhsī's claim: the Ḥanafīs hold to both the Sunna and reasoned opinion, more than those who claim to be people of ḥadīth
10. B12.08 · خلاف التابعي · A Follower who was one of the scholars of the Companions' age counts in their consensus
11. B12.09 · حدوث الخلاف بعد الإجماع · If a new feature arises in a case the scholars once agreed on, the old consensus does not decide it

In short

• This chapter asks what binds us beyond the Qurʾān's words [Overview]. The Prophet's acts may be followed unless shown to be his alone [B12.01]. Earlier prophets' law binds when known through the Qurʾān or the Prophet [B12.05]. A lone Companion's opinion is proof where qiyās cannot reach [B12.06].

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Why it matters

• Because a Companion's opinion can come from what he heard from the Prophet, the Ḥanafīs follow ʿAlī's minimum dower of ten dirhams, which qiyās could never fix [B12.06].

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B12.01 · أفعال النبي · If we do not know whether the Prophet did something as a duty or not, following him in it is permitted until it is shown to be his alone

• In plain words: If the Prophet did something on purpose, may we do it too? Suppose we do not know whether it was a duty, a recommendation or merely allowed. This covers only his intended acts, not slips, forgetfulness, or acts of plain human nature. ⚑ al-Karkhī, a Ḥanafī shaykh, said we then know only that it was permitted for him, and following him needs proof. al-Jaṣṣāṣ agreed, except that he said following him is permitted to us until proof shows the act was his alone. Sarakhsī calls this the sound view. "In the Messenger of God you have a good example" says "you have", not "you must".
• Example: The Prophet avoided wine while it was still lawful, yet no one was obliged to avoid it: following him was allowed, not required.
• Who disagrees: Some said suspend judgment until proof; Sarakhsī calls this "false on reflection", since it ends up either forbidding or permitting. Others said we must always follow him unless proof excludes it; he answers with the verse's "you have".
• In his words: "'For you' shows it is permitted to us, not binding on us": «فَفِي قَوْله ﴿لكم﴾ دَلِيل على أَن ذَلِك مُبَاح لنا لَا أَن يكون لَازِما علينا» (v2/88)
• Deeper: v1 B12.01

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B12.02 · اجتهاد النبي · Where no revelation came, the Prophet waited for it, then judged by his own reasoning; a judgment God left uncorrected is certain proof

• In plain words: When no revelation came on a case, did the Prophet judge by his own reasoning (ijtihād)? Sarakhsī's soundest view: he waited for revelation until he no longer hoped for it on that matter, then judged by opinion and reasoning. God never left him in error, so a judgment left uncorrected is certain proof.
• Example: Some of his opinions were corrected by revelation, as with "God has pardoned you: why did you give them leave?" (Q 9:43). Others he took by opinion, not revelation, and they stood: he adopted the dream of the call to prayer (adhān) this way, Sarakhsī says, and the adhān binds as certain proof.
• Who disagrees: Some deny that he reasoned at all, since he speaks only by revelation (Q 53:3–4) and opinion can err. Sarakhsī answers that the verse is about the Qurʾān, or means he does not speak from his own desire; reasoning is neither. Others say he used revelation sometimes and opinion sometimes.
• Deeper: v1 B12.02

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B12.03 · فعله الموافق للكتاب · When something the Prophet did or said matches the Qurʾān, it explains the verse; it is not a new ruling

• In plain words: If the Prophet does or says something the Qurʾān already contains, is it a new ruling or an explanation of the verse? The Ḥanafīs say it comes from the Qurʾān and explains it. His word and act in law come from revelation. Where the recited revelation already has the ruling, there is no need to suppose a separate, unrecited revelation (revelation to the Prophet that is not part of the Qurʾān).
• In his words: "When it is manifestly known in the recited revelation, we know it proceeds from that": «فَإِذا كَانَ ذَلِك ظَاهرا مَعْلُوما فِي الْوَحْي المتلو عرفنَا أَنه صادر عَن ذَلِك» (v2/97)
• Example: He taught tayammum to a person in major impurity (junub). The Ḥanafīs take this from Q 5:6, so its "or you have touched women" means intercourse, not touching by hand.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī's followers call it a new ruling unless shown otherwise, since a new ruling gives more than the verse already gave. Sarakhsī answers that supposing an unrecited revelation, on doubt and with no need, is not allowed.
• Deeper: v1 B12.03

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B12.04 · الزمان والمكان في الفعل المبين · When the Prophet's act explains a command, the time and place of the act are not part of the rule, unless the text itself is unclear about them

• In plain words: When the Prophet's act shows how to carry out a Qurʾānic command, do its time and place become conditions? Sarakhsī says the explanation lies in the act and how it was done, not in when or where. But if the text itself is unclear about time or place, as with prayer, the time or place of his act is part of the explanation.
• Example: He entered iḥrām for ḥajj in the ḥajj months, yet iḥrām before those months is valid. His two rakʿas after ṭawāf at the Station of Ibrāhīm do not have to be prayed at that spot.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī makes the time a condition (and, on one view, the place), from the Prophet's constant practice. Sarakhsī compares wuḍūʾ: the Prophet made it within the prayer times, yet wuḍūʾ before the time is valid.
• Deeper: v1 B12.04

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B12.05 · شرائع من قبلنا · An earlier prophet's law binds us as our Prophet's law, until abrogated, but only when known through the Qurʾān or the Prophet

• In plain words: Do the laws of earlier prophets bind Muslims? The soundest view for the Ḥanafīs: yes, as our Prophet's own law, until abrogated. But only when the Qurʾān or the Prophet tells us it was their law. What the People of the Book report, or what Muslims read in their books, does not count, since those books were altered.
• Example: Abū Yūsuf argued from "a life for a life", which the Qurʾān says God wrote for the Children of Israel in the Torah (Q 5:45), that a man is killed in retaliation for killing a woman.
• Who disagrees: One group says an earlier law lasts as that prophet's own law until abrogated. Another says it ends when the next prophet comes, citing the Prophet's anger at a Torah page in ʿUmar's hand. A third group says it passes into our Prophet's law however we come to know it. Sarakhsī's soundest view takes that transfer, like property passing to an heir, but counts only what the Qurʾān or the Prophet tells us.
• Deeper: v1 B12.05

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B12.06 · قول الصحابي · A lone Companion's opinion, when no Companion is known to differ, is proof where qiyās cannot reach; ⚑ on the sounder view it also outranks qiyās

• In plain words: A Companion gave a ruling, and no other Companion is known to have disagreed: does his opinion outrank qiyās? All the Ḥanafīs, early and later, agree it is proof where qiyās cannot reach the ruling, like fixed amounts, since there he can only have heard it from the Prophet. ⚑ Beyond that they differ. al-Bardaʿī says it outranks qiyās, and Sarakhsī calls this the sounder view: a Companion's ruling may be a report from the Prophet, and his opinion is stronger than ours. al-Karkhī puts qiyās first. It holds only once the Companions' age ended with no contrary view.
• Example: ʿAlī fixed the minimum dower at ten dirhams, and the Ḥanafīs follow him, since qiyās cannot set an amount.
• Who disagrees: al-Karkhī argues that Companions ruled by opinion, could err, and differed among themselves. Sarakhsī answers that they could differ because they were equals; once one spoke and their age ended with no one contradicting him, his word is proof.
• Deeper: v1 B12.06

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B12.07 · أصحابنا المتمسكون بالسنة والرأي · Sarakhsī's claim: the Ḥanafīs hold to both the Sunna and reasoned opinion, more than those who claim to be people of ḥadīth

• In plain words: Who, in Sarakhsī's view, truly holds to both the Sunna and reasoned opinion? He says the Ḥanafīs do, more than those who claim to be people of ḥadīth. They let a strong sunna abrogate the Qurʾān, act on mursal reports (whose chain skips a link), and put an unknown narrator's report and a Companion's opinion before qiyās. Only then do they use sound qiyās. He quotes Muḥammad: working by ḥadīth is not sound without opinion, nor opinion without ḥadīth.
• Who disagrees: This is Sarakhsī's charge against al-Shāfiʿī: by rejecting mursal reports he "left many sunnas", and by using a weak kind of qiyās from mere resemblance he acted "without proof". This is his polemic; al-Shāfiʿī's side is not given here.
• Deeper: v1 B12.07

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B12.08 · خلاف التابعي · A Follower who was one of the scholars of the Companions' age counts in their consensus

• In plain words: Does a Follower's dissent stop the Companions from reaching consensus? If he reached their age as one of its scholars able to reason for himself (mujtahid), the Ḥanafīs say yes: while he dissents, their consensus is not complete. What counts is being one of the age's scholars, not being a Companion. A Follower's opinion does not, however, outrank qiyās.
• In his words: "His view counts in their consensus, in our view, so that their consensus is not complete with his dissent": «فَإِنَّهُ يعْتد بقوله فِي إِجْمَاعهم عندنَا حَتَّى لَا يتم إِجْمَاعهم مَعَ خِلَافه» (v2/114)
• Example: al-Nakhaʿī disliked marking sacrificial camels (ishʿār), so Abū Ḥanīfa held there was no Companion consensus in favour of it.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī says consensus is an honour for the Companions alone. Sarakhsī answers that the Companions let such Followers judge by their own opinion: ʿUmar and ʿAlī appointed Shurayḥ as judge.
• Deeper: v1 B12.08

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B12.09 · حدوث الخلاف بعد الإجماع · If a new feature arises in a case the scholars once agreed on, the old consensus does not decide it

• In plain words: Scholars agreed on a ruling, then a new feature arose in the case that they dispute: does the old agreement still decide it? The Ḥanafīs say no. The consensus covered the case as it was, for its own reason, and never covered the new feature. The new case needs its own proof.
• Example: Scholars agreed a slave woman could be sold before she bore her master a child. Once she has, the Ḥanafīs say that old agreement is no proof that she may still be sold; some scholars say it is. The same holds for a general text: a non-Muslim under a safe-conduct (mustaʾman) who spies may not be killed on the strength of "kill the polytheists".
• Who disagrees: Some scholars say the old consensus stays proof until a new one, since "certainty is not removed by doubt". Sarakhsī answers that the proof was never the consensus alone but the reason behind it.
• Deeper: v1 B12.09

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